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preferencefor equality. If the policymaker is not a utilitarian,but ratherhas a
"socialwelfare function" that is equity regarding to some degree, then she faces
a critical choice. Should she care about the equalization of expected well-being
(the ex ante approach), or should she care about the expected equalization of
actual well-being (the ex post approach)? Should she focus on the equality of
prospects or the prospectsfor equality?
In this Article, we bring the ex ante/ex post problem to the attention of legal
academics, provide novel insight into when and why the problem arises, and
highlight legal applications where the problem figures prominently. We ultimately conclude that welfarism requires an ex post approach. This is a counterintuitive conclusion, because the ex post approach can conflict with ex ante
Pareto superiority. Indeed, this Article demonstrates that the ex post application of every equity-regardingsocial welfare function-whatever its particular
form-must conflict with ex ante Pareto superiority in specific situations.
Among other things, then, this Article shows that legal academics who care
about equity must abandon either their commitment to welfarism or their commitment to ex ante Pareto superiority.
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INTRODUCTION

Imagine a social decision maker-a legislator, a regulator, a
judge-who cares about inequality. This is not, let us say, her only
concern-she would not be satisfied to see everyone equally wretched.
But it does inform her choices and is sometimes decisive. Suppose
further that she has to decide whether to encourage a certain new
technology. The technology will make most individuals better off.
But a few will die. Maybe the new technology is the automobile, and
the few are the pedestrians who will be run down. Or maybe it is a
new vaccine for a contagious disease, and the few are those who will
have a fatal reaction. When she arrives at the portion of her policy
analysis that concerns inequality, how should she assess the equity effects of this technology? Would it help if everyone were equally likely
to be a pedestrian casualty or have an adverse reaction to the vaccine?
Would her concern for inequality be assuaged, in other words, by an
"equality of prospects"? Or would she reason that what matters is what
actually happens, and what actually happens is in all cases disequalizing? That is, would she focus on the certainty that some will pay
dearly while others benefit, and regard as irrelevant the uncertainty
regarding who will end up in which position?
There are likely as many ways to approach this problem as there
are philosophies of social choice. Our concern in this Article is how
the -problem should be addressed within the bounds of a particular
approach to social choice called "welfarism." Welfarism holds that social choices should be evaluated solely according to how they affect
the well-being of society's members. Importantly, the approach is
broad enough to allow concern for inequality of well-being across individuals. But it does not admit criteria like "fairness," "rights," or
'justice" -at least not as foundational criteria for choice.'
Debates about welfarism have, in recent years, consumed much
energy within legal scholarship and related fields. Within legal studies, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell's recent book defending welfarism, Fairness Versus Welfare,2 has prompted a vigorous and extensive

A welfarist social planner might, for example, encourage legal institutions that
involve legal "rights," but the planner's choice among the different options presented
to her-for example, different institutional structures-will itself be resolved solely
with reference to the distribution and amount of well-being.
2 LouIs KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE
(2002).
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debate. Similar scholarly discussions appear within normative economics, although welfarism remains the dominant position. 4 Within
philosophy, a third arena of dispute, welfarism and related views are
surely not dominant, but they remain important contenders. 5
We take a different tack. Rather than contributing directly to the
debate about welfarism, our primary object is to identify and grapple
with a large problem that arises within welfarism. For purposes of this
Article, we take welfarism as given-although, as we shall explain below, the Article should also be of much interest for nonwelfarists, and
for those engaged in the debate between welfarism and nonwelfarism.
Call the problem illustrated by our initial hypothetical the "ex
ante/ex post" problem. Although it has received little attention, especially within legal scholarship, the ex ante/ex post problem is the
natural product of two essential specifications for any systematic approach to normative discourse about law. 6 The first is the ability to
See, for example, the discussion of Fairness Versus Welfare in the Journal
of Legal
Studies, 32J. LEGAL STUD. 245-362 (2003), and the book reviews and responses by such
prominent figures as Jules Coleman, Richard Fallon, and Daniel Farber. Jules L.
Coleman, The Grounds of Welfare, 112 YALE L.J. 1511 (2003) (book review); Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Should WeAll Be Welfare Economists? 101 MICH. L. REV. 979 (2003); Daniel A.
Farber, What (If Anything) Can Economists Say about Equity? 101 MICH. L. REV. 1791
(2003) (book review).
4 See, e.g., ROBIN BOADwAY & NEIL BRUCE, WELFARE
ECONOMICS 143-44 (1984) (assuming welfarism in considering possible social welfare orderings); AMARTYA SEN,
CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 18-19 (1982) (discussing the welfarist tradition
in economic theory); Walter Bossert & John A. Weymark, Utility in Social Choice, in 2
HANDBOOK OF UTILITY THEORY 1099 (Salvador Barbera et al. eds., 2004) (reviewing
scholarship on welfarist social choice); Marc Fleurbaey, On the Informational Basis of Social Choice, 21 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 347, 374 (2003) (noting that the "most trodden
route" in social choice theory in reaction to Arrow's theorem has been to retain welfarism but allow interpersonal welfare comparisons).
See, e.g., Richard J. Arneson, Welfare Should Be the Currency ofJustice, 30 CAN.
J.
PHIL. 497, 497 (2000) (claiming that "if we adopt an objective account of welfare and
properly accommodate concerns about individual responsibility," then the criticisms
against welfare as the "currency of justice" will lose force); Andrew Moore & Roger
Crisp, Welfarism in Moral Theary, 74 AUSTRALASIANJ. PHIL. 598, 613 (1996) (contending
that "[w] elfarism remains a powerful and attractive position in contemporary ethics").
6 There is a small literature in welfare economics that addresses
the choice between ex ante and ex post social welfare maximization and the closely related problem
of marrying egalitarian concerns with uncertainty. See, e.g., Elchanan Ben-Porath et al.,
On the Measurement of Inequality Under Uncertainty, 75J. ECON. THEORY 194 (1997); Larry
G. Epstein & Uzi Segal, QuadraticSocial Welfare Functions, 100J. POL. ECON. 691 (1992);
Thibault Gajdos & Eric Maurin, Unequal Uncertainties and Uncertain Inequalities: An
Axiomatic Approach, 116J. ECON. THEORY 93 (2004); Peter Hammond, Ex-Post Optimality
as a Dynamically Consistent Objective for Collective Choice Under Uncertainty, in SOCIAL
CHOICE AND WELFARE 175 (Prasanta K. Pattanaik & Maurice Salles eds., 1983) [hereinafter Hammond, Ex-post Optimality]; PeterJ. Hammond, Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Welfare Op3
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account for the fact that policy outcomes are often uncertain-an inescapable difficulty of real-world policy analysis. The second is the
ability to incorporate a social dispreference for inequality-a feature
most would probably regard as important (to varying degrees) and
one of the advertised attractions of welfarism. 7
Because these specifications are so central to real-world policy discourse, the ex ante/ex post problem that they generate is ubiquitous
in law and policy. Part VI of this Article reviews but a sampling of the
kinds of the legal and policy issues that implicate the ex ante/ex post
problem. How much should be spent on security against terrorist acts
and other dangers that put many at moderate risk, but severely harm
relatively few? What is the proper scale and scope for social insurance? What are we to make of the fact that residents in a particular
neighborhood voluntarily agree to accept compensation in return for
living near a toxic waste site with potential health risks? Is that the
end of the issue? Should so-called "individual risk" tests continue to
be used in environmental regulation? Should plaintiffs be allowed to
recover for pain-and-suffering damages? Who should bear the burden
of proof at trial? How severely should we sanction violations of the
law? At what rate should we tax capital gains?
timality Under Uncertainty, 48 ECONOMICA 235 (1981);John M. Marshall, Welfare Analysis
Under Uncertainty, 2 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 385 (1989); Ross M. Starr, Optimal Production and Allocation Under Uncertainty, 87 Q.J. ECON. 81 (1973). A few philosophers have
also discussed these issues. See, e.g., JOHN BROOME, WEIGHING GOODS: EQUALITY, UNCERTAINTY AND TIME 174-200 (1991); Wlodek Rabinowicz, Prioritarianismand Uncertainty: On the InterpersonalAddition Theorem and the Priority View, in EXPLORING PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY: FROM ACTION TO VALUES 139 (Egonsson et al. eds., 2001). Our
analysis is indebted to this scholarship but, we believe, also advances it. As mentioned,
legal scholars have generally overlooked the ex ante/ex post problem. For two recent
exceptions, see Alon Harel, Zvi Safra & Uzi Segal, Ex-Post Egalitarianismand Legal Justice, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 57 (2005); Daniel Markovits, Quarantinesand Distributivejustice, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 323 (2005). Harel, Safra, and Segal conceptualize the ex
post application of a social welfare function as we do, and show how the ex post application of an egalitarian social welfare approach can lead to recommendations for
criminal law that differ from those of utilitarianism. This is an important piece. Ours
advances on it in a variety of ways, particularly in distinguishing between different variants of equity regard, in clarifying how the divergence between ex post and ex ante
approaches can arise for these different variants, in clarifying the conflict with ex ante
Pareto superiority (as defined infra note 28), and in engaging the normative question
of which approach is more attractive. Markovits is less formal and does not work
within welfarism, but provides a valuable discussion of the difference between ex post
and ex ante evaluations of the fairness of public health policies-specifically quarantines and mass vaccinations.
7 See, e.g., KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 2, at 26-28 (stating that welfarism includes both utilitarianism and views that are concerned about the distribution of wellbeing).
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To be more concrete about the nature and extent of the ex
ante/ex post problem we must also become more abstract. Suppose
then that we are in control of a society consisting of two individuals,
call them JANET and JOHN. Imagine we face a choice between two
alternative policies, UNCERTAIN and CERTAIN. The outcome of
UNCERTAIN is, as its name indicates, uncertain. Half the time it increases JANET's well-being by 900 units with no effect on JOHN's.
Half the time it increases JOHN's well-being by 900 units with no effect on JANET'S. The policy CERTAIN always increases JOHN's wellbeing by 400 units and JANET'S by 400 units also. Which policy
should we choose?
In conformity with the limited information given in the example,
assume that we are welfarists, so that we must decide solely on the basis of how the two policies affect JOHN and JANET's well-being. Let
us further assume that we care not just about "efficiency"-the total
amount of well-being summed over the two individuals-but also
about "equity"-how evenly the total amount of well-being is distributed across the two individuals.
If both policies had but a single certain outcome, our task would
be (relatively) simple. We would evaluate the policies along the two
dimensions of equity and efficiency. In the event that neither policy
was superior along both dimensions, our choice would depend upon
the precise manner in which we traded off the two criteria.
UNCERTAIN, however, has two possible outcomes, and this raises
the question of how we ought to combine them in assessing that policy's overall efficiency and equity. In fact, UNCERTAIN's effect on total well-being is the same across its two outcomes: total well-being always increases by 900 units. The question thereby reduces to how we
should combine UNCERTAIN's effect on equity across its two outcomes. And this depends on whether we take an "ex ante" or an "ex
post" approach.
Before we explain the ex ante and ex post approaches, a crucial
point of terminological clarification is in order. These are both approaches to choice under uncertainty. They are both applicable at
the very same moment in time-namely the time of choice-where
the policymaker, uncertain about the outcome of each of the policies
available to her, must pick one of the policies. The term ex post is potentially confusing, because it may suggest that the ex post approach is
retrospective, applicable at a later point in time than the ex ante approach. But that is not what we mean by these terms. A better term
for the ex post approach to choice under uncertainty might be the
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"expected social welfare" approach; a better term for the ex ante approach might be the "expected individual well-being" approach. We
use the terms ex post and ex ante instead because these have become
the standard vocabulary in the literature within welfare economics
about choice under uncertainty.8 But the reader must take note that
ex post and ex ante are terms of art (to be defined in a moment) and,
again, that the two refer to competing methods for choice under uncertainty, both of which are applicable at the moment of choice.
What, then, do these competing approaches to policy choice under uncertainty involve? Under the ex post approach, we first judge
the equity of each possible policy outcome and then combine these
judgments to form an overall equityjudgment for the policy. Assuming that JANET and JOHN are initially equally well off, the UNCERTAIN policy is certain to be disequalizing. In each possible outcome,
one individual moves 900 units of well-being ahead of the other. It so
happens that the individual moving ahead is different across the two
outcomes. But no matter. Whatever the outcome of UNCERTAIN,
inequality is created where there was none before.
Of course, UNCERTAIN's disequalizing effect has to be balanced
against the fact that it always increases total utility by 900 units. Yet
UNCERTAIN's disequalizing effect is nonetheless a strike against it.
And depending on the relative importance that we place on equity,
this may be enough to make us prefer its rival. Although CERTAIN
increases total well-being by less-only 800 units-it is not disequalizing.
Under the ex ante approach, we (a) view the policy as offering
each individual a "lottery" across possible outcomes; (b) consider the
prospects for well-being that each individual's lottery provides her;
and (c) judge the equity effect of a policy by considering the distribution of these individual prospects. Proceeding in this manner in
evaluating UNCERTAIN we see that it offers equal prospects to JOHN
and JANET: each has the same chance of benefiting by 900 units.
From an ex ante perspective, therefore, UNCERTAIN is not at all disequalizing. Since that is true of CERTAIN as well, efficiency is the decisive criterion, and UNCERTAIN is thereby the clear winner.
We see, then, that determining which policy to choose depends
not only on our view of the relative importance of equity and efficiency, but also on our view of whether policies with uncertain outcomes ought to be evaluated according to an ex ante approach, which
8

See supranote 6 (citing this literature).
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considers only the equity of prospects, or an ex post approach, which
considers only the equity of actual outcomes. Under an ex post approach, UNCERTAIN appears disequalizing, and we may well find sufficient reason to choose CERTAIN despite its relative inefficiency.
Under an ex ante approach, UNCERTAIN's disequalization within
outcomes is not cognizable, and its greater efficiency makes it always
the favored choice.
In fact, the difference between ex ante and ex post approaches is
even more stark than this. Suppose we ask: what policy would each individual prefer? In judging the effect of policy UNCERTAIN on their
individual well-being, JANET and JOHN would each have to combine
two equally likely outcomes: that their well-being increases by 900
units and that their well-being remains the same. IfJANET and JOHN
simply averaged their well-being over the two outcomes (as is dictated
by the standard theory of rational choice under uncertainty9 ), they
would each view the welfare effects of UNCERTAIN as equivalent to a
certain increase in well-being of 450 units. This being greater than
400, they would unanimously prefer UNCERTAIN to CERTAIN.
And yet, as we have seen, an ex post decision maker who places
sufficient weight on equity might well prefer CERTAIN. The fact that
the ex post approach does not necessarily respect the unanimous desires of the two individuals might seem to be an indictment of that
approach. In fact, itjust as well calls into question the value of ex ante
unanimity, at least within the confines of welfarism.
One might argue against using the ex post approach in this example because it violates principles of autonomy and majoritarianism.
But these values per se have no place in welfarism. A welfarist may argue on the basis of these values only to the extent that they increase
individual well-being, which, in our example, they do not.
One might also argue against the ex post approach on the basis of
the fact that it chooses a policy that makes both individuals worse off.
This would implicitly add to welfarism the additional criterioncommonly referred to as the "Pareto principle"-that if everyone is
better off under one policy alternative, that is the one we must choose.
But resort to the Pareto principle is too glib. For in the presence
of uncertainty there is no single Pareto principle. An ex post analysis
that chooses CERTAIN over UNCERTAIN may well violate the Pareto

9 That is, expected utility maximization, as described in DAVID M. KREPS,
A
COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 71-81 (1990). Note that the units in this example
are units of utility, not wealth. Risk aversion is, therefore, not implicated.
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principle applied ex ante to prospects. But it does not violate the
Pareto principle applied ex post to actual outcomes. In the example,
there are two possible outcomes, and in each possibility one individual
is better off with UNCERTAIN (900 versus 400) and the other with
CERTAIN (400 versus 0). It never turns out to be the case, therefore,
that both individuals are better off under one of the policy alternatives. Consequently, the ex post Pareto principle imposes no restrictions on ex post welfare analysis in this example.
In short, a welfarist social planner who cares to some extent about
equity, but nevertheless respects the ex post Pareto principle, may
choose a policy (here, CERTAIN) despite the fact that every affected
individual would prefer a different choice (here, UNCERTAIN).
We regard this as a dramatic result. Why? We have known since
the seminal work of Amartya Sen that non-welfarism can lead to
Pareto-inferior choices,'0 and Kaplow and Shavell's recent book, Fairness Versus Welfare, has advanced our understanding of this point."
Contemporary work in philosophy makes clear that welfarism that rejects the Pareto principle is also a conceivable view. 12 Finally, it is well
recognized, and easy to see, that social choice may well deviate from
unanimous individual preferences when individuals' views regarding
the likelihood of various policy outcomes do not accord with those
used in social decision making. 1
What is not widely understood, and what we hope this Article will
(among other things) help bring to light, is that even the welfarist social decision maker who respects the ex post Pareto principle, and

10Amartya

Sen, The Impossibility of a ParetianLiberal 78J. POL. ECON. 152, 155-57

(1970) (discussing the conflict between liberal values and the Pareto principle).
1 See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 2, at 52-58 (discussing how "fairness-based
analysis leads to the choice of legal rules that reduce the well-being of eveiy individual"); see also Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Any Non-welfarist Method of Policy Assessment
Violates the Pareto Principle, 109J. POL. ECON. 281, 282 (2001) ("[F]or any non-welfarist
method of policy assessment... there always exist circumstances in which the Pareto
principle is violated.").
12 See Larry Temkin, Equality, Priority, and the Levelling
Down Objection, in THE IDEAL
OF EQUALITY 126, 154-55 (Matthew Clayton & Andrew Williams eds., 2000) (concluding that equalizing welfare levels by reducing the well-being of better-off individuals
constitutes a moral improvement in one respect, namely equality).
13 See BROOME, supra note 6, at 152-54. Change
the example so that in one policy
outcome for UNCERTAIN both individuals enjoy an increase of 900 units in their wellbeing and in the other both experience no change in their well-being. If both individuals regard the first outcome, (900, 900), as very likely, they will favor UNCERTAIN
over CERTAIN. Ifthe social planner regards the first outcome as very unlikely, however, she will favor CERTAIN.
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whose probability assessments are in line with each individual's, can
choose a policy that each individual, maximizing her own expected
utility, would reject. Ex ante Pareto superiority turns out to be a controversial principle even where, one would have thought, its foundation was firmest.
In this Article, we bring the ex ante/ex post problem to the attention of legal academics, provide insight into when and why the two
approaches diverge, highlight legal applications where the distinction
makes a difference, and ultimately defend-at least within the bounds
of welfarism-an ex post approach, despite its implication that society
should sometimes reject laws, policies, or rulings that from an ex ante
perspective make everyone better off.
Part I clarifies some basic constructs: welfarism, Paretian social
welfare functions, equity-regarding social welfare functions, and the
ex ante and ex post approaches to social choice under uncertainty.
Part II explores in depth precisely how and why the ex ante and ex
post approaches can produce conflicting recommendations. Part III
shows that this continues to be true even if the government has in
place a highly effective system for forcing policy "winners" to compensate policy "losers," and even when individuals face no barriers to insuring privately against bad outcomes. Part IV focuses on the fact that
an ex post Paretian can violate the ex ante Pareto principle. Part V
argues for the ex post approach over the ex ante. And Part VI provides illustrative examples of the many and diverse legal implications
of the ex ante/ex post problem.
Who should read our Article? Welfarists certainly should. Specifying welfarism under conditions of uncertainty-in particular, choosing between ex ante and ex post approaches to welfarist social
choice-is a crucial problem with which law-and-economics scholars
and other legal-academic welfarists have largely failed to grapple.
But nonwelfarists, too, ought to attend to our analysis. Choice
under uncertainty is a general issue for normative theories, not unique
to welfarism, and close analogues to the ex ante/ex post problem
arise within various nonwelfarist views. For example, a theory concerned with the "fair" distribution of resources will need to decide
whether fairness involves actual or expected resource holdings, and a
theory that recognizes certain moral rights might specify those in ex
post terms (a right not to be killed) or in ex ante terms (a right not to
be put at high risk of death).
Finally, the debate between welfarists and nonwelfarists should itself be sensitive to the problem of choice under uncertainty. The two

HeinOnline -- 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 289 2006-2007

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LA W REVIEW

290

[Vol. 155: 279

approaches should be tested against each other, not in the artificial
laboratory where decision makers know for certain what the outcomes
of their choices will be, but under conditions faced by real, nonomniscient humans. By specifying and defending one approach to
welfarist choice under uncertainty, we also contribute-albeit indirectly-to the broader debate about welfarism.
More specifically, on this last score, our Article shows that Kaplow
and Shavell's arguments for welfarism in Fairness Versus Welfare are, to
some extent, overstated. Fairness Versus Welfare takes pains to emphasize that it is possible to be welfarist, respect the unanimous wishes of
the citizenry (i.e., respect Pareto superiority), and attend to the distribution of well-being. 14 But in the realistic context in which policies
have uncertain outcomes, it is not that simple. Equity-regarding welfarists face a dilemma: either (1) use the ex ante approach to social
welfare, which as we'll argue below is unsatisfactory; or (2) use the
more sensible ex post approach and be prepared to ignore the
unanimous objection of the citizenry. In other words, welfarists who
wish, justifiably we believe, to take an ex post approach to social welfare cannot both be non-utilitarian (equity regarding) and satisfy the
Pareto principle in its ex ante version.
Kaplow and Shavell correctly characterize welfarism as a moral
But they do not exview that is potentially sensitive to distribution.
plain the crucial point that this attractive feature of welfarism is purchased at the cost of either relinquishing full-blown Paretianism or
adopting the questionable practice of ex ante social welfare analysis.
Of course, that cost may be worth bearing.' 6 Still, it is important to be
clear about the features of equity-regarding welfarism, and its potential inconsistency with a Paretianism that insists not only on the Pareto
principle for outcomes, but on ex ante Pareto superiority as well.
Notwithstanding the argument in Fairness Versus Welfare,"7 the tension
with the Pareto principle is not unique to fairness approaches; it is also
characteristic of (what we take to be) the best versions of welfarism,

14

See, e.g., KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 2, at 28-38.

15

Id.

Indeed, we argue below that the ex ante Pareto principle is not compelling, at
least not within the bounds of welfarism. See infra Part V.
17 See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 2, at 52-58 (stressing conflict between the
16

Pareto principle and fairness theories).
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namely welfarist theories that are equity regarding and ex8 post. One
of the contributions of our Article is to clarify these points.
I. BASIC CONCEPTS: SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTIONS, EQUITY REGARD,
AND Ex ANTE VERSUS Ex POST SOCIAL WELFARE ANALYSIS

In this Part we introduce some of the basic concepts that will be
applied throughout the Article. For expositional purposes, we begin
by assuming that policy alternatives have certain outcomes. In this artificial environment, we first describe the basics of welfarist social
choice. We then discuss the rudiments of including a social dispreference for inequality in welfarist analysis. We conclude this Part by introducing uncertainty to the analysis, showing how this alters the welfarist's object of choice, and distinguishing between the ex post and
ex ante approaches to this new choice problem.
A.

Social Welfare Functions Under Certainty

What is welfarism? First, welfarism is, of course, a normativeviewone that tells decision makers how they "ought" to act, and that evalu-

ates choices as "better" or "worse." Second, welfarism adopts an approach to evaluating choices that is at least weakly consequentialist in
the following sense. Whether the decision maker should choose one

or another course of action depends solely on the outcomes ' of those

18

Kaplow is clear about the tension between equity-regarding welfarism and

Paretianism in other work. In a 1995 article, he identifies the conflict between ex post
egalitarianism and ex ante Pareto superiority and argues for utilitarianism. Louis Kaplow, A FundamentalObjection to Tax Equity Norms: A Callfor Utilitarianism,48 NAT'L TAX
J. 497, 499-501 & n.l1, 508 (1995). One may question whether this position is fully
consistent with the eclecticism of Fairness Versus Welfare, which embraces both utilitarianism and distributionally sensitive variants of welfarism. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note
2, at 27-28. One might well read Kaplow's earlier article to argue that the only acceptable version of welfarism-the only version consistent with both the sure-thing principle and ex ante Paretianism-is utilitarianism. See also Kaplow, supra, at 503-04 (accepting Harsanyi's axioms for rational social choice).
19 What exactly is an "outcome"?
Loosely speaking, an outcome is some state of
affairs. In this sense, for example, "Mount Vesuvius erupts in the twenty-first century"
is an outcome. But "outcome" in the loose sense is not a perspicuous way to capture
the core of welfarism and the disagreements within welfarism, particularly the disagreement between ex ante and ex post approaches to social choice, which is our ultimate concern. The problem is that loose outcomes can embed uncertainty. For example, the fact that "Mount Vesuvius erupts in the twenty-first century" leaves open
whether it erupts in 2005 or 2010, whether the eruption involves a large or small lava
flow, hot lava or cooler lava, and so on. And it is precisely in how to cope with uncertainty that ex post and ex ante welfarists disagree. Therefore, we use "outcome" in a
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choices. Finally, welfarism insists that individual well-being is the sole
feature of outcomes that differentiates them as a normative matter.2 °
Thus, if the (certain) outcomes of two policy choices are identical with
respect to well-being-in the sense that each individual is equally well
off in both outcomes-then the decision maker must be indifferent
between the choices.
Welfare economists typically make certain additional assumptions
about the structure of welfarism above and beyond those just described. 2' Because these standard assumptions facilitate our analysis
and because we wish to demonstrate that the complex issues described
in this Article arise within mainstream social welfare analysis, we will
adopt all of these additional assumptions.
First, it is assumed that an individual's well-being in various outcomes can be represented by "utility" numbers. This means that the
policy outcomes can be represented as vectors of utility numbers-with
one coordinate for each individual in the population.
Second, welfare economists assume that society has a complete
ordering over utility vectors. Each vector is better than, worse than, or
exactly equal to every other vector, and the ordering is transitive.
Third, welfarists typically assume that this ordering is "continuous." The definition of continuity need not concern us here. 22 What
is important for our purposes is an implication of continuity-that the
social orderingof outcomes can be represented by a social welfare function.23 The social welfare function maps each utility vector onto a
number, which represents the position of that outcome in the ordering.

stricter sense-to mean what philosophers call a "possible world," a complete description of a possible history of the universe. But see infta note 20.
20 In regard to our definition of "outcome," supra note 19,
note that some differences between possible worlds make no difference to anyone's welfare. This calls for
refinement of our notion of "outcome." An outcome, as we mean it, is a possible state
of affairs that is maximally specified with respect to human well-being. Although the description of the outcome may not be absolutely specific-it may still embed some uncertainty-all further specifications of it are equally good with respect to everyone's
welfare.
21 See generally BOADWAY & BRUCE, supra note 4, at 137-69 (reviewing
welfarist social
choice theory).
22 For a discussion of the continuity property for orderings and its
relationship to
functional representation, see KREPS, supra note 9, at 31, 36-37.
23 See BOADWAY& BRUCE, supra note
4, at 137, 139.
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Fourth, many contemporary welfare economists are willing to assume that utilities are interpersonally comparable to some degree.
This is a crucial assumption-Arrow's famous theorem demonstrates
that the absence of comparability, coupled with a few other assumpexists-and one that we believe
tions, implies....that no social ordering
25
One of us has presented a lengthy
to be independently justified.
26
case for interpersonal comparability elsewhere.
Fifth, it is commonly assumed that the social welfare ordering respects the Pareto principle. 27 If one person is affirmatively better off
in one outcome than in another, and no one is worse off, then the
first outcome must be ranked higher in the ordering. Translated into
the language of social welfare functions, the Pareto principle requires
that the social welfare function be monotonically increasing in each of
its arguments. We will use the term "Paretian social welfare function"
to mean a social welfare function that respects the Pareto principle.
Whether the application of that function under conditions of uncertainty respects the ex ante Pareto principle is, of course, a separate
question. By calling the social function itself "Paretian," we simply
mean that the ranking of outcomes-utility vectors-generated by the
function conforms to the Pareto principle.

24 See id. at 152-66. The bulk of optimal tax theory, for instance, is founded
on this

assumption. See, e.g., Nicholas Stern, The Theory of Optimal Commodity and Income Taxation: An Introduction, in THE THEORY OF TAXATION FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 22, 4649 (David Newberry & Nicholas Stern eds., 1987) (discussing the use of the social welfare function in optimal tax analysis).
5 AMARTYA K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 89-104
(1970) (describing the role of interpersonal comparability in Arrow's impossibility theorem and
arguing for partial interpersonal comparability).
26 See MATIHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS 39-52 (2006); Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 204-09 (1999).
27 See, e.g., Bertil Tungodden, The Value of Equality, 19 ECON. & PHIL.
1, 8 (2003)
("The Pareto Principle is the core of normative economics .. ").
28 Another point of terminology:
the Pareto principle (in either its ex post or ex
ante variants) is sometimes framed in terms of preferences and sometimes in terms of
well-being. For example, the ex post Pareto principle in the preference form says that
an outcome that at least one person prefers and no one disprefers is a better outcome;
the ex post Pareto principle in the well-being form says that an outcome which improves the well-being of at least one person, and makes no one worse off, is a better
outcome. The ex ante Pareto principle in the preference form says that a set of individual lotteries that at least one person prefers, and no one disprefers, is a better set of
lotteries; the ex ante Pareto principle in the well-being form says that a set of individual lotteries which is better for at least one person, and worse for no one, is a better set
of lotteries. The preference-based formulations of the Pareto principle presuppose a
preferentialist conception of well-being. Since we do not presuppose that conception,
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Although not technically implied by welfarism-which says only
that well-being is all that matters, but not how it matters-Paretianism
is so automatically adopted by most welfarists that it is virtually a core
commitment of the approach. 29 This accords with intuition. If the ultimate normative concern is human well-being, how can an outcome
that promotes the well-being of some individuals, and harms no one,
be worse? Thus, if an outcome increases the well-being of some individuals, and harms no one, we will say that it is an improvement."°
A sixth very plausible assumption is that the social welfare function is "symmetric" or "anonymous," meaning that the identity of individuals is irrelevant to the ranking of outcomes. If two utility vectors
have the same utility numbers, but in different orders, they must be
ranked the same.
Thus far, our presentation has adopted the standard premises of
social choice theory. But there is one standard assumption we reject-namely, that well-being consists in the satisfaction of preferences. The nature of well-being is highly controversial, as the philosophical literature shows. Hedonic views and "objective-list" views
compete with preferentialism, and for our purposes, there is no reason to choose among these views.21

see infra text accompanying note 31, we use the term "Pareto principle" throughout the
Article, to mean the principle framed in terms of well-being. In other words, the
"Pareto principle," for our purposes, is equivalent to the second prong of what John
Broome calls the "principle of personal good." See BROOME, supra note 6, at 165 (defining the principle of personal good to mean: "(a) Two alternatives are equally good
if they are equally good for each person. And (b) if one alternative is at least as good
as another for everyone and definitely better for someone, it is better"). Since the first
prong of Broome's principle is less central to our discussion, we use the term "Pareto
principle" to mean the second prong, rather than both prongs taken together.
29 It is conceivable that one could be
so concerned about equity that one would
reject an outcome that makes the most well off even more well off without affecting
anyone else. Cf Temkin, supra note 12, at 154-55 (emphasizing that a Pareto-inferior
move may increase equality). We do not explore this line of argument in this Article.
Whatever its plausibility, the aim of this Article is to show why, even if the argument is
wrong and egalitarianism is best specified by coupling it with the Pareto principle for
outcomes, a conflict with ex ante Pareto superiority can arise.
30 Superficially, it seems possible that
the unaffected individuals might envy those
made better off, or might suffer a loss in status-but any "envy" or "loss of status" will
tend to reduce the welfare of those who suffer it, in which case the ex post Pareto
principle will no longer apply.
31 The simple preference-satisfaction view says that an
individual has greater welfare in outcome 0 as compared to outcome O* if and only if he prefers 0 to 0*. Refined variants of this view require the individual's preferences to be well-informed or
otherwise idealized. Hedonic views say that an individual's well-being in 0 as compared to 0* depends on the pains and pleasures he experiences in the two outcomes.
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Welfarism, utility numbers, the concept of a social welfare function, the Pareto principle, equity regard, and the choice between ex
ante and ex post approaches to social choice are generic constructs or
problems that apply regardless of the specific nature of well-being.
For example, the welfarist who adopts a hedonic view will see an individual's utility number as representing her hedonic state; will see each
outcome as a vector of hedonic utilities; will conceptualize the social
welfare function as mapping each vector of these hedonic utilities
onto a number representing the vector's place in the social ordering;
and can insist that this function be both monotonically increasing in
each of its arguments (Paretian) and symmetric. Similarly, if certain
basic measurement axioms are satisfied, the objective-list theorist will
have at her disposal utility numbers representing individual well-being
in the objective-list sense; can then represent each outcome as a vector
of these sorts of utilities; and so on.
To be clear: we do not wish to reject the preference-based view of
welfare, but simply to remain agnostic about whether well-being consists in preference satisfaction, in the occurrence of pleasurable states
and the avoidance of pain (hedonism), in the attainment of objective
goods, or in something else. These issues are just orthogonal to the
problem of ex post versus ex ante approaches to social planning.
To sum up: the normative framework for our analysis assumes
that the appropriate choice for a social planner in some choice situation depends on the outcomes of each choice; that such outcomes can
be represented by utility vectors, with utility representing individual
well-being, whatever that may consist of (not necessarily preference
satisfaction); 3 that the appropriate ordering over utility vectors can be

Objective-list views specify a list of welfare goods (such as friendship, accomplishment,
the pursuit of knowledge, and so on) that are objective in the sense that an individual's
life in one outcome can realize more of these goods without the individual preferring
the outcome. For good discussions of these competing views and overviews of the philosophical literature on well-being, see JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING 7-72 (1986); DEREK
PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 493-502 (1984); T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO
EACH OTHER 108-43 (1998); Mozaffar Qizilbash, The Concept of Well-Being, 14 ECON. &
PHIL. 51 (1998); see also ADLER & POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 26, at 28-39 (discussing different views of well-being, and ultimately defending an account that looks to both actual and idealized preferences).
32 One important technical question here involves
admissible -transformations of
the utility vector. In effect, how much information about well-being do the utility numbers contain? Can they be transformed by a common affine transformation, a common multiplicative transformation, or perhaps by no transformation at all? Interpersonal comparability of welfare levels and differences, without more, would permit
common affine transformations of the utility numbers. So would the Pigou-Dalton re-
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represented by a social welfare function defined on these vectors; that
this function respects the Pareto principle and is symmetric; and, finally, that it is equity regarding, a construct we will now explore.
Before we proceed, however, we should address one concern that
the reader may have. Who exactly is this "social planner" who is supposed to be guided by the social welfare function? The answer, in
brief, is that she is an idealized governmental official-one who is not
constrained by the computational limitations of "bounded rationality.''33 A normative framework that identifies appropriate choices by
deriving them from an ordering over all possible outcomes (specified
in sufficient detail to capture everything that matters to well-being)
cannot be implemented by real officials, since real officials do not
have the mental machinery to grasp such an ordering. Still, the generic concepts of a social welfare ordering and social welfare functions-like many idealizations in normative theory-are useful in figuring out what real-world actors should do. The specifics of realworld application are examined in Part VI.
B. Equity Regard Under Certainty
One of the attractive, yet underappreciated, features of welfarism
is that it is broader than utilitarianism. The utilitarian social welfare

quirement itself. (If one vector is Pigou-Dalton equalizing relative to another, then a
common affine transformation of all the utilities in the two vectors preserves this relationship.) See infra text accompanying note 39. But particular social welfare functions
may preclude common affine transformations. For example, the ordering of utility
vectors generated by the sum of the square roots of individual utilities is not invariant
to the addition of a constant. On these issues, see, for example, BOADWAY & BRUCE,
supra note 4, at 144-47 (discussing invariance requirements in social choice theory,
which specify "the set of transformations that can be applied to [a] ...household utility vector without changing the [social welfare ordering]"); Bossert & Weymark, supra
note 4, at 19-29 (discussing invariance requirements).
For purposes of this Article, we will assume that the utility numbers are absolutethat no transformations are permissible. We conjecture, but will not attempt to demonstrate, that the ex ante/ex post divergence results demonstrated in this Article
would obtain even if some transformations of the utility vectors are permissible-either
common affine transformations or the class of transformations permitted by the social
welfare function itself, whichever is more restrictive.

Cf BROOME, WEIGHING GOODS,

supra note 6, at 217 (suggesting that prioritarian and utilitarian approaches to social
choice may collapse into each other, given limitations on the measurability of wellbeing); Rabinowicz, supra note 6, at 143-44 (discussing Broome's view).
33 See 3 HERBERT SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY
291 (1997) ("The
term 'bounded rationality' is used to designate rational choice that takes into account
the cognitive limitations of the decision maker-limitations of both knowledge and
computational capacity.").
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function simply adds individual utilities, ranking utility vectors in accordance with their total utility)s4 It is insensitive to distribution, in
the sense that the change in social welfare produced by a given
change in any individual's utility does not depend either on that individual's utility level or on the utility levels of others in society. Social
welfare changes by the same amount regardless of how well off or
badly off that individual is, either in absolute terms or compared to
others.3 5 The utilitarian social welfare function falls within the general category of Paretian symmetric social welfare functions.36 But
there are Paretian social welfare functions that, unlike utilitarianism,
are equity regarding; and there are also non-utilitarian, non-equityregarding social welfare functions. These logical relationships are illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Paretian Social Welfare Functions
Non-Equity
Regarding,
Non-Utilitarian

Equity
Regarding

Utilitarian

Utilitarianism's insensitivity to distribution is not only well known,
but the source of much criticism-criticism that we find persuasive
and need not recapitulate here.
Relatedly, we find it very hard to
see why the appropriate social welfare function would be some other,

' This characterization of utilitarianism is accurate for the "fixed population" case
(where the same individuals exist in every outcome), but not necessarily for the "variable population" case, which we do not discuss in this Article. On "variable population" problems in social choice theory, see generally CHARLES BLACKORBY ET AL.,

POPULATION ISSUES IN SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY, WELFARE ECONOMICS, AND ETHICS 129-

208 (2005).
35 The utilitarian may not be indifferent as to the
distribution of resources, since
the function from resources to utility (the measure of well-being) may not be linear.
For example, it is widely assumed that money has diminishing marginal utility. Utilitarianism, however, is indifferent to the distribution of well-being itself.
36 Henceforth we drop the term "symmetric,"
which is assumed.
37 See, e.g., Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams, Introduction,
in UTILITARIANISM AND
BEYOND 1, 4-5 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982) (noting that utilitarianism
involves a "drastic obliteration of usable information," including information about the
distribution of utility).
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non-utilitarian variant of a non-equity-regarding social welfare function. The strongest criticisms of utilitarianism-within welfarisminvolve its failure to attend to equity, and such arguments also apply to
other non-equity-regarding social welfare functions. Henceforth, and
without belaboring the arguments in favor of distribution as a normative consideration independent of maximizing overall welfare, our
analysis will assume that the social welfare function is equity regarding
in some degree.
But what exactly makes a Paretian social welfare function equity
regarding? A substantial literature in economics addresses distributive
justice and provides a canonical answer which, we think, is quite
powerful. An equity-regarding social welfare function satisfies the socalled "Pigou-Dalton" principle, also known as the "weak principle of
transfers."
Pigou-Dalton/Principle of Transfers
Given any outcome, if a fixed amount of utility
is transferred from an individual with an initially higher utility to one with an initially
lower utility, decreasing the distance between
their utilities, then the social value of the outcome must increase.39
The Pigou-Dalton principle requires, in effect, that a zero sum
equalizing transfer between any two individuals increase social welfare. Suppose, for example, that there are three individuals in our society, labeled 1, 2, and 3, with initial utilities of 100, 200, and 300, respectively. If we were to take 50 units of utility from person 3 and
transfer them to person 1, the utility vector would become 150, 200,

For overviews of the economic literature on equality, see FRANK A. COWELL,
MEASURING INEQUALITY (2d ed. 1995); AMARTYA SEN, ON ECONOMIC INEQUALITY (expanded ed. 1997); Charles Blackorby et al., Income Inequality Measurement: The Normative Approach, in HANDBOOK ON INCOME INEQUALITY MEASUREMENT 133 (Jacques Silber
ed., 1999); F.A. Cowell, Measurement of Inequality, in I HANDBOOK OF INCOME DIsTRIBUTION 87 (Handbooks in Econ. Series No. 16, Anthony Atkinson & Francois Bourguignon eds., 2000); Bhaskar Dutta, Inequality, Poverty and Welfare, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE 597 (Handbooks in Econ. Series No. 19, Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 2002).
39 See, e.g., Dutta, supra note 38, at 607. As discussed
in Appendix Section B, another technically weaker restriction found in the literature, also referred to as the
Pigou-Dalton principle, tests only those utility vectors across which individuals do not
change rank. Given symmetry, this alternative definition is equivalent to the one we
provide here. We choose our definition (even though it is stronger in the absence of
symmetry) because we find it more intuitive.
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250. If the social welfare function satisfies the Pigou-Dalton condition, then it must assign a higher value to the second utility vector
than to the first. If instead we transferred 150 units of utility from
person 3 to person 1, the utility vector would become 250, 200, 150,
and person 3 and person 1 would change rank. The transfer would
overshoot the initial dispersion between persons 1 and 3. The distance between their utilities, however, would still decrease (from 200
to 100) and any Pigou-Dalton respecting social welfare function would
have to increase under the transfer. 4°
40

Several technical notes regarding the Pigou-Dalton condition are in order.

First, the Pigou-Dalton principle gains additional power in combination with symmetry. If we transferred 250 units of utility from person 3 to person 1, in the example in
the text, the vector would become 350, 200, 50. Persons 3 and I would change rank as
above, but, unlike above, the distance between their utilities would increase and the
Pigou-Dalton principle by itself would impose no requirements on an equity-regarding
social welfare function in this case. Combined with symmetry, however, the PigouDalton condition would require that the social welfare function prefer the original outcome. This is because the second outcome would, by symmetry, be regarded as equivalent to 50, 200, 350. And the original vector 100, 200, 300 could be generated from 50,
200, 350 by a zero sum transfer, bringing the utilities of persons 3 and I closer together.
Second, the Pigou-Dalton principle also gains some power in combination with
transitivity. Compare the initial utility vector 100, 200, 300 with the utility vectors 225,
225, 150. At first glance, the Pigou-Dalton principle seems to impose no requirement
regarding the ranking of these two vectors. Because all three utilities differ, the two
vectors are not related by a pairwise zero sum transfer (let alone one that is equalizing). However, the utility vectors are related by a sequence of pairwise zero sum transfers that are equalizing. The vector 100, 200, 300 becomes 250, 200, 150 with a transfer of 150 units of utility from person 3 to person 1, and then 225, 225, 150, with a
transfer of 25 units of utility from person 1 to person 2. The welfare function must
prefer the second vector to the first and the third to the second, and so, by transitivity,
must prefer the third to the first.
Third, the Pigou-Dalton principle is directly related to another common way of
stating that one utility vector displays more inequality than another, namely "Lorenz
Dominance." The "Lorenz curve," applied to a utility vector, specifies, for all x between 0 and 100, the percentage (x) of total utility possessed by the least well off x percent of the population. The endpoints of the Lorenz curve are the same for all utility
vectors: 0% and 100%. In between, a greater Lorenz curve signifies that each least
well off x percent possesses a greater portion of total utility. Hence, a greater Lorenz
curve represents greater equality. Accordingly, utility vector A is said to "Lorenz
dominate" utility vector B if A's Lorenz curve is somewhere above B's and nowhere below. One can show that this is equivalent to saying that A can be generated from B by a
sequence of equalizing transfers, a la Pigou-Dalton. See, e.g., Dutta, supra note 38, at
607-09 (discussing the connection between the Pigou-Dalton principle and Lorenz
dominance).
Finally, it should be noted that the Pigou-Dalton condition (and the Lorenz dominance condition) is not a complete description of inequality. A complete measure
would, for every pair of utility vectors, specify either that one vector is more unequal
than the other, or that the two vectors are the same in terms of inequality. In contrast,
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For the remainder of this Article, we shall accept the view that defines equity regard as Pigou-Dalton respecting and focus on Paretian
social welfare functions that are equity regarding in this sense. It
should be stressed that the Pigou-Dalton condition is not particularly
demanding. There are, in fact, a large variety of Paretian equityregarding social welfare functions. The literature discusses the forms
that an equity-regarding social welfare function might take. 41 Most of
our analysis of the ex ante/ex post divergence is not tied to a particular social welfare function, and so we will not discuss the possibilities
in detail here. Our interest here is not in advocating a particular conception of distributive justice, but in clarifying that-whatever the
conception-maximizing the expectation of equity and maximizing
the equity of individuals' expected utilities can conflict, even with
compensation and insurance in play.
One important distinction within the family of equity-regarding
social welfare functions that should be mentioned is that between
functions that are separable in individual utilities, and those that are
not.42 Separability means that the ranking of two outcomes cannot
depend on the utility of indifferent individuals: those whose utilities
are the same in both outcomes. Separability corresponds to a noncomparativist conception of equity, which says that changes to an individual's well-being have greater weight the worse off that individual
is in absolute terms. The term used in the philosophical literature for
this conception is "prioritarianism."43 By contrast, "comparativists" are

the Pigou-Dalton condition makes no statement whatsoever about the relative inequality of two utility vectors that are not related by a sequence of mean-preserving equalizing transfers. Rather, the Pigou-Dalton condition is a minimum requirement for any
complete measure (and any equity-regarding welfare function). As we will discuss, one
complete measure of inequality that respects the Pigou-Dalton condition is the Gini
coefficient. Infra text accompanying notes 45-46.
41 See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, ON ECONOMIC INEQUALITY (1973);
sources cited supra
note 4.
42 See Marc Fleurbaey, Equality Versus Priority: How Relevant is the
Distinction?
(Sept. 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://cerses.shs.univ-paris5.fr/
marc-fleurbaey.htm (follow "Equality vs priority: How relevant is the distinction?" hyperlink) (discussing the separability of individuals in social rankings).
43 Much of the recent philosophical literature on equality focuses on the
choice
between "prioritarian" and nonprioritarian conceptions of equality. See generally LARRY
S. TEMKIN, INEQUALITY 245-82 (1993) (discussing prioritarianism, using the term "extended humanitarianism"); THE IDEAL OF EQUALITY (Matthew Clayton & Andrew Williams eds., 2000); Tungodden, supra note 27. "Prioritarianism" is a bit of a fuzzy term.
It is not clear whether prioritarianism means (1) any equity-regarding welfarism that
generates a social ordering of outcomes that is separable in individual utilities; or,
more narrowly, (2) any such approach which, in generating a ranking of policies (un-
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essentially concerned with the pattern of well-being. They make holistic judgments: the fact that individual 1 moves up a given increment
and individual 2 down a given increment might be a good thing given
one background allocation of utility to other individuals, but not
given another.
The choice between prioritarian/noncomparativist and comparativist views of•44equality has been much discussed in the recent philosophical literature.
We will not enter this debate, because we need
not. Both views are represented in the family of equity-regarding
Paretian social welfare functions. Prioritarians/noncomparativists accept the Pigou-Dalton condition and the additional requirement of
separability. Comparativists accept the Pigou-Dalton condition, but
reject the separability requirement.
Prioritarianism/noncomparativism is most naturally expressed via
one of the standard functional forms employed by economists theorizing about equality, namely the additive social welfare function,
p(u,) +... + p(u,) where p is strictly concave. (The square root social
welfare function, p(u) = Ju is an example.)
On the other hand, a social welfare function that first weights individual utilities according to the rank of the individual's utility in the
population, with greater weight given to individuals with lower utility,
and then adds the weighted utilities is an example of a comparativist
social welfare function. The social welfare gain from increasing any
given individual's utility depends on her own utility and the utility levels of others via that individual's rank in the population. Rankweighted social welfare functions gain importance by association with
the Gini coefficient, a fairly natural way to measure inequality and one
of the most popular ways of doing so. Applied to utility vectors, the
Gini coefficient is proportional to the average distance between all
possible pairs of utilities divided by mean utility. 45 One can show that

certain sets of outcomes) consistent with the sure-thing principle, can be represented
by an additive social welfare function applied in an ex post manner. See Fleurbaey, supra note 42, at 6-7, 17-18 (stressing that a ranking of outcomes that satisfies the PigouDalton principle and separability can, but need not, be represented by an additive
function of utilities). At a minimum, it seems correct to say that approaches to social
choice that fall in the latter, narrower category are "prioritarian," and that is how we
use the term in this Article.
44 See sources cited supra note
43.
The Gini coefficient is typically written as G=j 'r
u, ul, where
/I
u, is mean utility. However, we find the following equivalent formulation easier to interret:
G
u.
The rightmost factor
sth
.is...ce
a
e
in individuals'
' utilities.. More spe-=ter ' to=, u, -uj ,JIs
the
average
distan cle between

,
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the Gini coefficient respects the Pigou-Dalton condition: PigouDalton equalization always reduces the Gini coefficient. One can also
show that the simplest equity-regarding rank-weighted social welfare
function-one that weights the worst-off individual in a population of
I individuals by , the second-worst-off by I-1, etc.-may be rewritten as
UUG, where U is the simple utilitarian sum of utilities and G is the
Gini coefficient. 46 The first term, U, is an "efficiency" term, measuring the size of the utility pie. The second term, UG, is an equity term,
where inequality is specifically measured by the Gini coefficient (multiplied by total utility). Thus, rearrangements of the total utility pie
that do not change its size (i.e., do not change U) are evaluated as favorable under this welfare function if and only if they reduce the Gini
coefficient. Conversely, as shown in the Appendix, any rank-weighted
social welfare function with weights that increase by a constant increment in the progression downward through the ranking, from more
well-off to less well-off individuals, can be represented as the subtraction of a utilitarian term and an equity term stated as a function of the
Gini coefficient.
We have explained and defended the Pigou-Dalton definition of
equity regard, and have demonstrated how this is a quite catholic
definition-encompassing both "priori tarians" and equality theorists
who care essentially about patterns. What does the definition leave
out?47 Some conceptions weaken the Pigou-Dalton condition. Pigou-

cifically, I(V1-1/2 is the number of unordered pairs of utilities {u,,ujI where i #j.
And
ijui -ujj is the sum of the distance between the elements of all such unordered pairs. This average distance between individuals' utilities is then normalized
by the mean u. Initial multiplication by . has little effect when is large. For more
on the Gini coefficient, see Appendix Section C.
46 More precisely, this social welfare function may be rewritten as I(I+1)U
-IUG,
which for large !is roughly proportional to the formula in the text. Two social welfare
functions that are proportional to each other always give the same ranking, whether
both are applied ex ante or both are applied ex post. For more on this see Appendix
Section C.
47 Technically, adopting the Pigou-Dalton principle leaves out two social
welfare
orderings derived from John Rawls's work: maximin, and its cousin, leximin. See, e.g.,
Philippe Mongin & Claude d'Aspremont, Utility Theory and Ethics, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
UTILrIY THEORY 371, 415-19 (Salvador Barber et al. eds., 1998) (discussing leximin
and maximin). In fact, however, both are effectively included as limiting cases.
Maximin ranks outcomes by looking solely to the utility level of the worst-off person in each outcome. Maximin fails Pigou-Dalton: transferring from the richest to the
second-to-worst-off makes no difference to the social ranking. Indeed, maximin fails
the Pareto principle: improving the well-being of the second-to-worst-off (or any one
other than the worst-off individual) and leaving everyone else unaffected makes no difference to the social ranking.
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Dalton counts any equalizing transfer as increasing social welfare. It is
possible to stipulate that only a subset of equalizing transfers are equity improving, and that any Paretian social welfare function that respects the thus diluted Pigou-Dalton condition is equity regarding.
In particular, scholarship on equality suggests that the PigouDalton principle might be weakened to regard as equity improving
only the following types of transfers:
" Extreme: Any fixed transfer from the best-off person to the
worst-off person. 481
* Poverty linei Any fixed transfer to someone below a poverty
line (most simply, some absolute utility level). 4 9
" Across the mean: Any fixed transfer from someone above the
mean to someone below the mean.5O
* Below the mean: Any fixed transfer from someone below the
51
mean to someone worse off below the mean.

Leximin, which compares two outcomes by comparing the worst-off in both, then
(if they are equal) the second-to-worst-off, and so on, does satisfy the Pigou-Dalton
principle. But we still exclude it from our analysis-first, for the technical reason that
leximin is a discontinuous ordering that cannot be represented by a social welfare
function; second, and more substantively, because leximin preserves one of the troubling features of maximin, namely the lexical priority to the worst off. A tiny improvement in the well-being of the worst-off individual guarantees a social improvement, even if that tiny improvement is secured at large costs to the well-being of other
poor individuals.
Nonetheless, both leximin and maximin can be approximated within the set of
rank-weighted social welfare functions that assign all individuals strictly positive weight
and strictly greater weight to those with strictly lower utility. All such social welfare
functions are Paretian and satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle. Thus, for all practical
purposes, we are including maximin and leximin: on any finite set of possible policies,
however large and comprehensive, there is a Paretian, Pigou-Dalton social welfare
function that ranks these choices in precisely the same way.
48 Cf Tungodden, supra note 27, at 11-13 (discussing a
"conditional contracting
extremes" requirement, a stronger principle that stipulates that an outcome is better if
the best-off individuals are made worse off and the worst off are made better off by any
amount, leaving everyone else unaffected).
49 See Roger Crisp, Equality, Priority, and Compassion, 113
ETHICS 745, 755-63 (2003)
(discussing the moral significance of "compassion" thresholds).
50 The "relative mean deviation" measure of inequality-the
sum of the absolute
value of the differences between each individual's well-being and mean well-being-is
sensitive to transfers across the mean, but not to transfers on one side of the mean.
SEN, ON ECONOMIC INEQUALITY, supra note 38, at 25-27.
51 Cf Peter Vallentyne, Equality, Efficiency,
and the Priorityof the Worse-Off 16 ECON.
& PHIL. 1, 10 (2000) ("The intuitions of most egalitarians will hold... that equality is
increased.., by slightly inefficient transfers from one person below the mean to a
worse-off person."). Vallentyne himself does not advocate this particular principle.
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The extreme transfers principle seems entirely too weak, and the
mean-based tests give implausible relevance to the mean. Poverty line
views are more plausible, but fail to account for equalizing transfers
from the wealthiest to those who are much less well off, and yet not
impoverished.
However, rather than flesh out these substantive objections to diluted Pigou-Dalton conceptions of equity, we will point out that these
conceptions are not immune from the ex ante/ex post divergence.
What drives the divergence (as demonstrated below) is that a transfer
may be disequalizing within an outcome, but equalizing (or indifferent) in terms of expected utilities across outcomes. This point is true
whether the equalizing transfers are all Pigou-Dalton transfers, or only
a subset. For ease of exposition, and because the undiluted PigouDalton condition is both the most widespread definition of an equityregarding social welfare function and intuitively quite supportable,
our detailed analysis will focus on equity regard in the Pigou-Dalton
sense-with the conjecture that the analysis generalizes to social welfare functions that are sensitive to a proper subset of Pigou-Dalton
transfers.
C. Adding Uncertainty: Ex Post vs. Ex Ante Social Welfare Analysis
In the foregoing analysis, we assumed that policies resulted in certain outcomes and were thus represented in our social welfare function as utility vectors. When we add the possibility that policies have
uncertain outcomes, their representation becomes more complicated.
To make the complication manageable, let us assume that the planner
knows the set of possible outcomes for each social choice, that this set
is finite, and that the planner knows the probability of each out52
come.
Instead of utility vectors the welfarist now associates policies with
(1) a probability distribution over outcomes, plus (2) a utility matrix.
The latter is depicted for three individuals and four states of the world
in Table 1. Each column of the utility matrix corresponds to a different possible "state of the world." Each row of the matrix corresponds
to a different individual in the population. Thus the column of individual utilities corresponding to a given state represents the policy
outcome in that state. Each column is associated with a probability.

52

See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning
of "out-

come").
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Table 1: Policy as Utility Matrix
States of the World
A
B
C
D
1
"
*

U4
A

2

S3

u2

3

U1

U1

UD

"2

u

u

B

B

3

C

2

C U

u3

D
2

u3

The difference between ex post and ex ante is now easy to state.
The ex post planner assigns a value to the policy matrix by first applying his social welfare function to each column (state) regarded as a
utility vector, and then calculating the expected value of these statespecific social welfare function values. The ex ante planner reverses
the order: she first aggregates across columns, determining an expected utility for each individual, and then applies the social welfare
function to these expected utilities. In short, the ex post planner first
applies the social welfare function and then applies the expectation
operator; the ex ante planner first 5applies the expectation operator
and then the social welfare function. 3
For readers who prefer formulas, 54 the difference between the ex
ante and ex post approaches in evaluating the policy in Table 1 may
be expressed as follows. The ex ante planner first calculates expected
utility for individual 1:
Eu1 =l u+... + pu,,
where pA,p ,pC ,pD are the probabilities of the states. She then does
the same for individuals 2 and 3. Lastly, she calculates the social welfare of the vector of expected utilities:

53A

note on terminology: we reserve the term "social welfare function" for the
function from utility vectors to numbers. Ultimately, however, the social planner's
preferences concern not utility vectors, but lotteries over utility vectors (i.e., utility matrices with probabilities assigned to each column), and one might use the terminology
"social welfare function" to describe the corresponding function on the latter set that
represents these preferences. The "social welfare function" in this larger sense is, in
the ex post case, the expected value of what we are calling the "social welfare function," and, in the ex ante case, the value under what we are calling the "social welfare
function" of the expected value of the utility vectors.
54More general and precise formulas are included in the Appendix.
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(1)

This isthe number that she uses to rank the policy at hand relative to
alternatives. The ex post planner first calculates social welfare in state
A based on the utility vector in state A, w' = w(uA ,u 4). He then
does the same for states B, C, and D. Lastly, he calculates the expected value of these welfare values:
Ew = pAWA + p W1 + pw1WC + p DW

.

(2)

He then uses this number to compare the policy at hand to alternative
policies. Thus, while the ex ante planner ranks policies according to
the social welfare of expected utilities, (1), the ex post planner ranks
policies according to the expected social welfare, (2).
A simple example further illustrates the difference between the
two approaches. Imagine that the social welfare function w is equal to
the sum of the square root of individual utilities. (This is an equityregarding function, specifically a prioritarian one.) Imagine, moreover, that there are two states that are equally likely, and two individuals, Jim and June. In the status quo, both individuals receive a utility
of 3.7 in both states. By contrast, as depicted in Table 2, the policy's
outcomes are uncertain: in one state,Jim has utility 4 and June utility
0; in the other state,Jim has utility 9 and June utility 4.
The ex post application of w assigns a value of 3.5 to the policy.
The ex ante application of w assigns to the policy a value of 3.96. Because the status quo is certain-the same utility vector results regardless of the state-the ex post and ex ante application of w to the status
quo assigns it the same value, namely 3.85 _ V-3.7+ N3-.7. So in this
case the differing methods for applying w lead to divergent recommendations for policy choice. The ex post method says that the status
quo is a better choice than the policy (because 3.85 is greater than
3.5), while the ex ante method says that the policy is a better choice
than the status quo (because 3.85 is less than 3.96).
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Table 2
State A

State B

Expected

p =.5

p =.5

Utility

Jim

4

9

6.5

June

0

4

2

14- + 6 = 2

r9 + J- = 5

w applied ex post:
2x.5 + 5x.5 = 3.5
w applied ex ante:
5+ [2 = 3.96

w (Jim, June)

As we have already explained, the terms ex ante and ex post may
be a little misleading. Both approaches take account of probabilities.
And both approaches are guides to choice, not just tools for retrospective assessment. The difference-subtle but vital-has to do with
the specific way in which the choiceworthiness of a probabilistic
choice is evaluated: the order of integration across states and persons.
Perhaps a better terminology might distinguish between "expected
individual well-being" (rather than ex ante), and "expected social welfare" (rather than ex post) approaches to choice under uncertainty.
However, for the sake of terminological consistency with the existing
literature on social choice under uncertainty, we will stick with ex ante
and ex post.
The ex ante and ex post valuations of a policy might coincide. In
fact, if the social welfare function is utilitarian (or more generally linear with weights that depend only on individual identity), the two
valuations must coincide. It makes no difference whether one takes
the expected value of the (weighted) sums of the columns (the ex
post approach) or the (weighted) sum of the expected values of the
rows (the ex ante approach). Indeed, the converse also holds.55 If the
social welfare function is such that ex post and ex ante valuations always coincide, then the social welfare function must be some weighted
sum of individual utilities (plus some constant term, which is irrelevant for social choice 56), with weights that depend only on individual

See infra Appendix Section A.
Adding a constant k to the social welfare function w changes the social welfare
of all policies in all states by precisely the same amount, namely k. It, therefore, in55
56
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identity. 5 7 If such weights are equal, the social welfare function is utilitarian. But if the weights are unequal, then the social welfare function
violates the symmetry condition. All told then, a Paretian, symmetric
social welfare function is guaranteed to make ex post and ex ante
valuations coincide if and only if that social welfare function is utilitarian.
The proposition that ex post and ex ante are guaranteed to converge only if the social welfare function is a weighted sum of utilities
is, mathematically, quite straightforward. That proposition is also a
direct implication of a substantially stronger theorem that John Harsanyi established fifty years ago.5s But it is not obvious what the exact

creases the expected social welfare of every policy by k. It also increases the social welfare of expected utilities under every policy by k. It is thus irrelevant to our analysis.
57 This "converse" proposition is a straightforward consequence
of the definition
of linearity. One way to see this is to notice that this converse is merely an extension to
a multidimensional domain of the basic point from individual risk analysis that risk
neutrality implies a linear (actually "affine," to be precise, see infra note 58) utility function. Risk neutrality means that the expected utility of a lottery over dollar amounts
equals the utility of the expected value of the numbers. The statement that ex post
social welfare equals ex ante social welfare is directly analogous to this: the social welfare function plays the role of individual utility; utility vectors play the role of dollar
amounts; ex post social welfare is like expected utility; and ex ante social welfare is like
the utility of the expected value.
Another way to think of it-one that takes account of the fact that we are dealing
with lotteries over (utility) vectors and not over (dollar-valuated) scalars-is this: First,
imagine a function of two variables onto one. Think of the function in a threedimensional graph with function values on a third axis, a "z axis," coming up out of the
page. Then take any finite group of points on the x-y plane and connect the dots to
make a polygon in the x-y plane. Finally, look at the function values over the region
bounded by this polygon. The statement that ex post social welfare equals ex ante social welfare means that the function values form a plane over this polygon (though, of
course, the plane will generally have a slope). Since this works for any finite group of
points, the function values must form a plane globally.
58 See John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic
Ethics, and Interpersonal
Comparisons of Utility, 63J. POL. ECON. 309 (1955). For a detailed discussion, see John
A. Weymark, A Reconsideration of the Harsanyi-Sen Debate on Utilitarianism, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING 255 (Jon Elster &John E. Roemer eds., 1991).
Harsanyi is famous for identifying the tension between ex ante Pareto superiority and
non-utilitarian approaches to social choice. More precisely, Harsanyi proves that, if
individuals and the social planner both obey the expected utility axioms, and the social
planner is indifferent between options when all individuals are also indifferent, then
the social planner's decisions are representable as the maximization of a social welfare
function equaling a weighted function of individual utilities (plus a constant). Within
the bounds of our simplified structure, which takes utility functions and social welfare
functions as given, Harsanyi's theorem implies the following: if, whenever the expected utility of each individual is the same across two policies the ex post social welfare is also the same, then the social welfare function is affine-meaning it is a linear
function of individual utilities plus a constant. To see why the proposition that ex
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connection is between ex ante/ex post divergence and equity regard,
nor whether the phenomenon of divergence is a pervasive one.
Moreover, it is crucial for lawyers to consider the role of compensation and insurance in mitigating divergence. Finally, the extent of the
conflict between the ex post application of an equity-regarding social
welfare function and ex ante Pareto superiority needs to be explored.
These are the issues that we now examine in turn.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE DIVERGENCE BETWEEN Ex POST
AND Ex ANTE APPROACHES TO SOCIAL CHOICE

The object of this Part is to illuminate how ex post versus ex ante
approaches to implementing an equity-regarding social welfare function can produce divergent assessments. Section A explicates the basic phenomenon by demonstrating that for all equity-regarding social
welfare functions, there are some choice situations that are evaluated
differently ex ante and ex post. The remaining Sections establish that
such divergence is ubiquitous. Differing evaluation of choice situations is particularly easy to produce for separable social welfare functions.59 Nonseparable social welfare functions are also vulnerable to
ex ante/ex post divergence when the utility rankings of individuals
differ across policy outcomes. 60

post/ex ante convergence implies a linear social welfare function is a straightforward
corollary of Harsanyi's theorem, consider the following: (1) if individual expected
utilities are equal as between two policies, then the ex ante approach must rank them
as equal; and (2) if, in turn, ex post and ex ante valuations always converge, then (in
particular) the ex post approach must be indifferent between two policies where each
individual's expected utilities are the same.
To be sure, using Harsanyi's theorem to prove that ex post/ex ante convergence
implies a linear social welfare function is a bit like the proverbial elimination of a mosquito with a bazooka. The theorem is more directly relevant to our analysis, below, of
the divergence between the ex post approach and ex ante Pareto superiority. See infra
note 93. We mention Harsanyi, here, because the body of scholarship to which this
Article aims to contribute-examining the interaction between equality, uncertainty,
and Pareto superiority-was spawned by Harsanyi's work.
59 For the definition of separable social welfare functions, see supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
60 As a preliminary matter, we should assuage one general worry that a technically
sophisticated reader might have about our approach. The analysis in this and subsequent Parts takes a particular social welfare function and applies it ex post and ex ante
to a given policy, or a given choice among policies, showing how the two approaches
can diverge. The reader might worry that social welfare functions are simply mathematical devices for representing orderings, and that we really should be comparing the
ex post application of the social welfare function and all admissible transformations of
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A. The Basic Phenomenon
In this Section we explore the basic connection between ex
ante/ex post divergence and welfare judgments about inequality. 6'
We show that, starting from any uncertain status quo, one can always
find a mean-preserving transfer that is Pigou-Dalton equalizing from
an ex ante perspective and yet Pigou-Dalton disequalizing from an ex
post perspective. This transfer, viewed as a policy, would therefore be
favored by every equity-regarding social welfare function applied ex
ante, and disfavored by every equity-regarding social welfare function
applied ex post. To make the point even more dramatically, we also
show that a policy may be Pigou-Dalton disequalizing in all states simultaneously, while at the same time Pigou-Dalton equalizing ex ante.

that function, on the one hand, to the ex ante application of the social welfare function and all admissible transformations of that function, on the other hand.
More precisely, the reader might worry that we should be comparing the ex post
application of the social welfare function and all affine transformations of that function to the ex ante application of that function and all increasing transformations of it.
The ex post approach ranks lotteries by taking expectations over the value of the social
welfare function in each state. Thus, the ex post application of any affine transformation of a social welfare function will preserve the ordering of lotteries generated by the
initial function. The ex ante approach ranks lotteries by applying the social welfare
function to the vector of expected utilities associated with the lottery. Thus, the ex
ante application of any increasing transformation (affine or not) of a social welfare
function will preserve the ordering of lotteries generated by the initial function.
The answer to this subtle but important worry is straightforward. If a particular
social welfare function generates ex ante/ex post divergence in some choice situation,
then any affine transformation of that function, applied ex post, will diverge from any
increasing transformation of that function, applied ex ante. Thus, the apparently naive approach our analysis takes-showing the conditions under which divergence over
choices can arise when a given social welfare function is applied ex post as opposed to
ex ante-reaches exactly the same results as a more complicated analysis that explicitly
considers certain admissible transformations of the function.
61 Equity regard is not the only source of ex
ante/ex post divergence. Suppose,
for example, that individual utilities in each of the two equally likely states are (100,
100) and (100, 100) in the status quo and would be (0, 0) and (200, 200) after implementing the policy-meaning the individuals have equal utility in all circumstances.
The policy leaves the individuals' expected utilities at their status quo level of (100,
100). But the policy "spreads" both individuals' utilities away from 100 across the two
states, making them 0 in one state and 200 in the other. The policy is perfectly neutral
from an ex ante perspective (and a slight change of the numbers would make it strictly
improving). But this is not necessarily the case from an ex post perspective. If marginal social welfare diminishes in individual utilities, then the policy is ex post social
welfare reducing (and would remain so were the policy numbers slightly changed). Because marginal social welfare diminishes, the 100 unit reduction in utilities in the first
state takes more away from social welfare than the 100 unit increase in utilities in the
other state gives back.
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Consider first a hypothetical policy that affects only one state.
Suppose that the vector ti...,t represents the change in utility effected by the policy in state s, with individuals indexed by subscripts 1
through . Each t' may be positive or negative. To focus on equity,
let this "transfer" be mean preserving, so that ts + ... + t' = 0. Viewed
from the perspective of state s taken alone, this transfer
6* might be
63
6
Pigou-Dalton equalizing, Pigou-Dalton disequalizing, ' or neither.
Which of these it is depends on the initial level of utilities in that state
us,...,us. Roughly speaking, if the transfer tends to go toward those
with high (low) initial utility in state s, it is disequalizing (equalizing).
The key insight is that this ex post transfer in state s also produces
a "transfer of expected utility" ex ante. In particular, where ps is the
probability of state s, expected utilities change according to
pSts,...,psts. To wit, when we transfer t' units of utility to individual 1
in state s, we also transfer psts units of expected utility to individual 1
from an ex ante perspective. Whether this transfer of expected utility
is equalizing, disequalizing, or neither from an ex ante perspective
depends, analogously, on the initial level of expected utilities.
The question is whether the transfer might be Pigou-Dalton disequalizing in state s and yet Pigou-Dalton equalizing ex ante. It is easy
to see that this is possible. The simplest Pigou-Dalton disequalizing
transfer within state s is a single pairwise transfer from an individual
with lower utility to an individual with higher utility. (In this case,
only two t7 's are nonzero.) This transfer can, nevertheless, be equalizing ex ante if the individual with the lower utility in state s is the individual with the initially higher expected utility. In this case, the transfer
of t units of utility from "poor" to "rich" within state s becomes a transfer of pst units of utility from rich to poor ex ante. 64
62 As discussed in supra note 40 and at infra Appendix Section
B, a multiperson
transfer is Pigou-Dalton equalizing if and only if it can be generated by a sequence of
pairwise transfers that are zero sum and reduce the distance between the utilities of
the two individuals. A multiperson transfer is Pigou-Dalton disequalizing if and only if
its additive inverse is Pigou-Dalton equalizing. The Pigou-Dalton principle, as defined
in supra Part I.B, plus transitivity implies that a multiperson transfer that is PigouDalton equalizing (disequalizing) must increase (decrease) social welfare.
63 Given a particularinequality measure respecting the Pigou-Dalton condition,
it
will be equalizing, disequalizing, or perfectly neutraL
64 Of course, in order for the transfer to be equalizing ex
ante, it must also not
overshoot the ex ante inequality between these two individuals. For example, if two
individuals start out with utilities (100, 90), and we transfer 3 units of utility from the
first to the second, we close the gap by 6 units. If we transfer 5, we close the gap entirely. If we transfer 7, we open a gap in the other direction, but not one greater than
the initial gap. However, if we transfer more than 10, we open a gap in the other di-
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Suppose, as shown in Table 3, that status quo utilities in two
equally likely states are (10, 20) and (200, 100), so that expected utilities are (105, 60). Consider a policy that transfers 10 units of utility
from the first individual to the second in the first state, thus changing
the first state's utility vector from (10, 20) to (0, 30). This is disequalizing in the first state. But the corresponding transfer of expected
utility-namely, -10 = 5 from the first individual to the second-is an
equalizing transfer from an ex ante perspective, wherein the first individual is better off.
Table 3
State A

State B

Expected

p =.5

p = .5

Utility

Status quo

Individual 1
Individual 2

10
20

200
100

105
60

Policy

Individual 1
Individual 2

0
30

200
100

100
65

It is vital to see that this example does not trade on a particular
kind of equity-regarding social welfare function. In this case, because
the policy is disequalizing in the first state in terms of utilities, but
equalizing in terms of expected utilities, any social welfare function
that is equity regarding in terms of satisfying the Pigou-Dalton principle-whether the function is comparativist or noncomparativist and
(more technically) whether it is continuous or discontinuous-will

rection that is larger than the initial gap. Thus, equalization is a matter not just of the
direction of the transfer, but also of its magnitude. But, returning to the example in
the text, since a transfer in this direction of any magnitude is disequalizing in state s, it
is still easy to see that the transfer can be made small enough to avoid overshooting ex
ante inequality.
This discussion points to another way in which the transfer can be disequalizing in
state s and yet equalizing ex ante. If an equalizing pairwise transfer must be both in an
initially equalizing direction and also not so large that it overshoots and causes greater
inequality in the other direction, then there are two ways for a transfer to be disequalizing, in particular, in state s. It can be initially disequalizing, as above. Or it can be
initially equalizing, but go too far. In the latter case, so long as it does not also go too
far ex ante, it will be disequalizing in state s and equalizing ex ante. Notice that this
arises when the same individual is initially better off in both state s and ex ante. See
infra Appendix Section D.
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count the policy as worse than the status quo if applied ex post, and
better than the status quo if applied ex ante.
More generally, given any status quo with at least one rank-contrary
state--that is, one state in which the utility ranking of individuals ex
post is not precisely the same as the expected utility ranking of individuals ex ante-we can always find some mean-preserving policy
change to this status quo that is Pigou-Dalton equalizing ex ante and
Pigou-Dalton disequalizing ex post. The significance of using a meanpreserving transfer is that the discrepancy between ex ante and ex
post evaluations arises solely due to different views regarding what is
equalizing and what is disequalizing. The significance of the application of the general Pigou-Dalton definition of equalization is that the
existence of this discrepancy is independent of the particular equityregarding social welfare function employed.
Less obvious from the foregoing discussion in this Section is that
the same result holds even if there is no rank-contrary state in the
status quo. 65 We can still find a mean-preserving transfer that is PigouDalton disequalizing ex post and Pigou-Dalton equalizing ex ante.
How so? Roughly speaking, it is always possible to find a transfer from
an initially better-off individual to an initially worse-off individual that
is great enough to "overshoot" inequality within the state wherein it is
made, but not so great that its (probability-discounted)
ex ante impact
66
overshoots inequality in expected utilities.
Of course, a policy will, in general, affect more than one state, and
so the next question that arises is whether such a general policy can be
ex post disequalizing-taking account of its effects across all statesand ex ante equalizing. Difficulties arise if the policy has differing
equity effects across states: that is, if it is Pigou-Dalton disequalizing in
some, Pigou-Dalton equalizing in others, and neither in still others.
Which effects dominate in ex post social welfare will depend on the
probability distribution across states and the particular manner in
which the social welfare function incorporates equity regard. No general statements can be made for the full class of equity-regarding social welfare functions.

65 The result holds so long as there is some inequality in some state. Note that this
assumption was unnecessary in the previous paragraph because it was implied by the
existence of a rank-contrary state. If there is no inequality in any state, then there is no
inequality ex ante, and all mean-preserving transfers in any state are disequalizing both
ex post and ex ante.
66 This logic is more completely spelled out in the second paragraph of note
64
supra.
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However, we can answer a more specific, but still informative
question: is it possible for a policy to be disequalizing in every state
taken individually, and yet equalizing ex ante? In this case, we can be
assured that the policy is disequalizing in ex post social welfare when
all states are aggregated, and so to this extent ex post social welfare
reducing (and at the same time ex ante social welfare increasing for
the fact that it is ex ante equalizing).
It is not difficult to see that even this is possible. Focus again on
policies that, now in every state, effect a simple pairwise transfer between a fixed pair of individuals, say individuals 1 and 2. Recall that
one way for such a policy to be disequalizing in state s is for it to transfer from the individual with low utility in that state to the individual
with high utility. Suppose that it does this in every state. Now in some
states the relative ranking of individuals 1 and 2 differs from their
ranking ex ante. This is similar to the case discussed above. In each
such "rank-contrary" state, therefore, the transfer, disequalizing intrastate, is equalizing ex ante, just as above. In other states, the relative
ranking of the two individuals is the same in that state as ex ante. For
these "rank-conforming" states, the within-state disequalizing transfer
is disequalizing ex ante. It is clear then that ex ante equalization requires that the expected value of the transfers in rank-contrary states
must exceed the expected value of the transfers in rank-conforming
67
states.
A simple example will clarify. Suppose that initial utilities for two
individuals in each of the two equally likely states are (40, 60) and (80,
20), so that expected utilities are (60, 40). Therefore, the first state is
rank contrary, and the second rank conforming. Suppose that the
policy transfers 20 units of utility to the higher utility individual in the
first state, and only 10 units to the higher utility individual in the second state, making the utility vectors (20, 80) and (90, 10). In this
case, expected utilities become (55, 45). Thus, the policy is equalizing
ex ante and yet disequalizing in every state. As a result, the policy is ex
ante social welfare increasing, but ex post social welfare decreasing.
What is happening here? The expected value of the disequalizing
transfer in the rank-contrary state, 120 =10, exceeds the expected

67

Moreover, so as not to overshoot ex ante to such an extent as to cause ex ante

disequalization, the excess of the first state over the second state can not exceed the
initial difference in expected utilities.
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value of the disequalizing transfer in the rank-conforming state,
2±10=5.68
A conceptually important special case of this phenomenon arises
when there is initially perfect equality ex ante. In this case, the disequalizing transfers in each state must perfectly cancel in expected
value in order to disequalize ex post and yet not disequalize ex ante.
For example, imagine that individuals in both of the states have utilities of 100, and the first state has a probability of 1/3. If the policy
changes the first state to (130, 70), then the second must be changed
to (85, 115) to preserve ex ante equality. The expected transfer in the
first state (30 x 1/3 =10) and in the second (15 x 2/3 =10) must be
equal. In the even simpler case where the two states have equal probability, the transfers in both states must be the same. So if the policy
changes the first state to (120, 80), the second must be changed to
(80, 120). We now see that this very simple case, which itself includes
theJANET andJOHN example in the introduction, is a special case of
a more general phenomenon. 69
B. Rank Uncertainty, Rank-Weighted Social Welfare, and the Gini Coefficient
The prior section identified the kind of equity-implicating policy
changes that produce ex ante/ex post divergence for every equityregarding social welfare function. A different approach is to pick out
a subclass of equity-regarding social welfare functions and give a fuller
description for that subclass of the kinds of policy choices that lead to
ex ante/ex post divergence. This Section, along with the next three,
takes this alternative approach. The present Section shows that ex
ante/ex post divergence is not an issue for certain kinds of policy
choices and a certain set of equity-regarding social welfare functions.
Let us say that a policy (be it the status quo or a policy that alters
the status quo) is "rank homogenous" if each individual has the same
rank in each possible state. A "rank-heterogeneous" policy is one that
is not rank homogenous. For example, the policy in Table 4 below is
rank-homogenous because individual 2 is the worst off in all three
68 Moreover, in conformity with note 67 supra, the excess
10 - 5 = 5 does not exceed the initial difference in expected utilities 60 - 40 = 20.
69 In accord with our discussion of the single state case in
note 64 supra, there are
other ways for the same phenomenon to arise. In some states, the disequalization can
come from overshooting the inequality. For such states, the transfers are counted for
ex ante equalization if the state is rank conforming and against if the state is rank contrary. Finally, note that by the same kind of reasoning described herein, a policy can
be disequalizing ex ante and equalizing ex post.
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states, individual 3 is always the best off, and individual 1 is always in
the middle.
Table 4: A Rank-Homogenous Policy
States of the world
A
B
C
1

50

41

85

.

2

20

40

60

,

3

51

60

100

Rank-homogenous policies are policies that involve no uncertainty
about the relative standing of different individuals. If a policy is rank
homogenous, there can be uncertainty about how much well-being
various individuals will have and what the differences between their
well-being levels will be, but not about whether any given individual
will be better or worse off than any other.
In an important class of equity-regarding social welfare functions,
ex ante social welfare equals ex post social welfare on the set of rankhomogenous policies. In other words, the social welfare number that
one would obtain applying such a social welfare function to a rankhomogenous policy in ex post fashion would be the same as the number one would obtain applying it in ex ante fashion.
The class of equity-regarding social welfare functions referred to
here are the rank-weighted social welfare functions discussed above in
Part I.B. Recall the simplest social welfare function of this form: that
ranking the most well-off person as 1, the second most well-off person
as 2, the third as 3, etc., all the way down to the least well-off person,
whose utility would be multiplied by I (the size of the population) before being added to social welfare. To be sure, not all rank-weighted
social welfare functions are normatively plausible. But some are. In
particular, as discussed in Part I.B, the Gini coefficient-a very common measure of inequality, indeed perhaps the measure most frequently used by social scientists-corresponds to a rank-weighted social welfare function.
Why do rank-weighted social welfare functions yield the same welfare number when applied ex ante or ex post to rank-homogenous
policies? The answer piggybacks on our earlier discussion of utilitari-
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anism and generalizes Harsanyi's famous result.
We noted in Part
I.C that if we are just taking the simple sum of utilities, it makes no
difference whether we sum expected utilities over individuals or take
the expected value of the sum of utilities in each state. More generally, there is no difference between ex ante and ex post social welfare
when the social welfare function is a weighted sum of individual utilities
with weights that do not change across states. Because individual
ranks do not change across states for a rank-homogenous policy, rank
is effectively fixed across states for purposes of evaluating such a policy. In this case, it does not matter whether we take the expected
value of a weighted sum of utilities or a weighted sum of expected
utilities.
Because the ex post and ex ante value of a rank-homogenous policy are necessarily the same under any rank-weighted social welfare
function, it follows that, for any choice situation between two rankhomogenous policies, even if the rankings differ across the two policies, a rank-weighted social welfare function will pick the same option
whether that function is applied ex ante or ex post. If, under an ex
post approach, the social welfare function assigns the first policy a
value of 1000 and the second a value of 2500, then under an ex ante
approach it must make the same value assignments. Thus, it must
pick the same policy. Of course, the same logic applies to the choice
among more than two individually rank-homogenous policies.
C. Strictly Concave Social Welfare Functions
Rank heterogeneity is not a necessary condition for ex ante/ex
post divergence across all equity-regarding social welfare functions.
Consider, for example, the class of social welfare functions that are
"strictly concave." Roughly speaking, a social welfare function is
strictly concave if each individual's utility makes a diminishing marginal contribution to social welfare. 71 That is, giving one more unit of
utility to a less well-off individual increases social welfare more than
giving one more unit of utility to a more well-off individual.
A rank-weighted social welfare function is not strictly concave. In
particular, the marginal impact on social welfare of changes in an in-

See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
More generally, increasing all individuals' utilities in any fixed proportion has a
diminishing impact on social welfare.
70
71

HeinOnline -- 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 317 2006-2007

318

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 155: 279

dividual's utility that do not upset utility rankings across individuals is
constant rather than diminishing.
A strictly concave social welfare function always assigns a greater
ex ante value to a policy 72 than its ex post value. Indeed, the converse
is also true. In other words, the ex ante value of a social welfare function
exceeds its ex post value for every uncertain policy if and only if that social welfarefunction is strictly concave.
An explication of the reasoning behind this result is beyond the
scope of our present discussion. Suffice it to say that this reasoning
has a close analogue in the theory of individual choice, where strict
concavity of individual utility for money translates into individual risk
aversion with respect to money-that is, an individual preference for
the expected
value of a money gamble as opposed to the gamble it73
self.
Because strictly concave social welfare functions always value a policy greater when applied ex ante than when applied ex post, it follows
that: ex post versus ex ante social planners, implementing strictly
concave social welfare functions, may evaluate policy choices differently. Again, unlike the case of rank-weighted social welfare, this is so
even if all the policies at issue are rank homogeneous. Indeed, the
policy choice may be differently evaluated under a strictly concave social welfare function even if, additionally, all such rank-homogeneous
policies share the same ranking. Take a rank-homogenous status quo
(also a "policy" in our framework), whose ex ante value is s and whose
ex post value is r < s. Consider a policy that is certain to result in some
given utility vector. Assume that each individual has the same rank in
this utility vector as in each state in the (uncertain but rankhomogenous) status quo. Because the certain-outcome policy leads to
the same result in each state, the social welfare function's ex ante and
ex post evaluation of the policy must be the same-call it q. Certainly,
we can imagine the case wherein q lies between rand s. 74 In that case,
ex ante application of the social welfare function prefers the status
quo, but ex post application prefers the policy.

72

That is, if the policy has some uncertainty-in other words, some divergence in

utility vectors across states. This is Jensen's inequality. See, e.g., Tristan Needham, A
Visual Explanation ofJense"n's Inequality, 100 AM. MATHEMATICAL MONTHLY 768 (1993).
73 E.g., KREPS, supra note 9, at 81-84.
74 By the intermediate value theorem, such a qwill exist, no matter how close
rand
s are, so long as the social welfare function is continuous on R' and we can find a certain policy with a value less than rand a certain policy with a value greater than s.
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In a sense, the "opposite" of a rank-homogenous policy is a permuting policy. A permuting policy has the following characteristic:
each state's utility vector is just a reordering of the other states' vectors. A given ordering can occur more than once and not every ordering need be represented. Table 5 gives an example. Recall that rankhomogenous policies have no uncertainty regarding rank: we know
how individuals are ranked; we just don't know the levels of their utilities. By contrast, rank is the only uncertainty in a permuting policy:
we know the levels of utilities; we just don't how they are assigned.
Table 5: A Permuting Policy
States of the world
C
B
A

,

1

50

20

20

2

20

50

51

3

51

51

50

As we prove in the Appendix, all equity-regarding social welfare
functions, including not only strictly concave social welfare functions
but also rank-weighted ones, must give a greater ex ante than ex post
valuation to a permuting policy. v5 Intuitively, the ex ante planner sees
less inequality in a permuting policy than does her ex post counterpart, because the switching of rank across states turns the expected
76
Permuting
utility calculation into an averaging across individuals.
policies therefore provide another ready recipe for generating ex
ante/ex post divergent choices-one directly parallel to the recipe we
used above for generating ex ante/ex post divergence from strictly

75 More precisely, the permuting policy must exhibit some uncertainty and
some
inequality. See infta Appendix Section F.
76 Specifically, one can show that taking weighted averages over permuted outcomes, as we do in taking expected utilities, corresponds to making a (multiperson)
mean-preserving equalizing transfer relative to any one of the outcomes. See supra note
62. It follows that expected utilities under any probability distribution over outcomes
must generate a higher social welfare value than any one of the permuted outcomes.
Therefore, under any probability distribution the social welfare of expected utility will
exceed the expected value of social welfare over such outcomes.
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concave social welfare functions. Given any equity-regarding social
welfare function and any permuting policy, produce an alternative
policy whose outcome is certain, and whose social welfare value (the
same for ex ante and ex post) lies between the divergent ex post and
ex ante values of the permuting Policy. 77 Then ex ante application of
the social welfare function will prefer the original, permuting policy,
while ex post application will prefer the alternative policy.
E. Prioritarianismand SeparableSocial Welfare Functions
The rank-weighted social welfare function is the leading example
of a nonseparable social welfare function. It is nonseparable because
the welfare contribution of increases in each individual's utility depends on how the individual's utility is weighted, which depends on
her rank, which in turn depends on the utility of other individuals.
What if we turn to separable social welfare functions, where the
social preference between two utility vectors cannot depend on the
utility of indifferent individuals? As discussed in Part I.B, separable
to a prioritarian/nonsocial welfare functions correspond
comparativist conception of social welfare. Our discussion there indicated that, at least in the context of evaluating policies with certain
outcomes, separable social welfare orderings could be represented by
an additive social welfare function-that is, one of the form
M,(,,,...,I-, ) = P (u, ) +... + 9 (u,). •"
The representation of prioritarianism/noncomparativism in the
context of uncertainty remains unsettled. 79 Let us assume that such
views imply an additive social welfare function in this context, so that
)+... + p(u), and ex
ex post social welfare is the expected value of
1 ,(u
ante social welfare is the same sum of functions applied to expected
utilities.
77 See supra note 74 (describing the assumptions that
guarantee the existence of
this alternative policy).
78 This assumes that the ordering is continuous. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. And the fact that w is the same for all individuals follows from anonymity/symmetry.
79 See supra note 43. Although a separable ordering over certain outcomes
can be
represented (assuming continuity) by an additive social welfare function, it can also be
represented by a nonadditive function. See Fleurbaey, supra note 42, at 6-7, 16-17. The
"correct" function, under conditions of uncertainty, is the one that accurately represents the social planner's preferences over lotteries. If, for example, she is an ex post
planner who is risk averse in social welfare, then her "real" social welfare function may
be a strictly concave transformation of the sum of some function of individual utilities,
rather than simply the sum of some function of individual utilities.
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Here, it emerges-just as in the case of strict concavity-that
rank heterogeneity is not a necessary condition for ex ante/ex post divergence. This is no coincidence. All equity-regarding additive social
welfare functions must be strictly concave. Why is this? The intuition
is simple. Suppose that individuals 1 and 2 have the same utility and
start repeatedly transferring small amounts from 1 to 2. After the first
transfer, the transfers are disequalizing: l's utility is now below 2's.
Thus, they must reduce social welfare. But this can happen only if w
increases at a decreasing rate, so that the additions to 2's utility are
worth less than the subtractions from l's.
Because additive social welfare functions are strictly concave, it follows that every such function gives a greater ex ante than ex post value
to every policy. Moreover, ex ante versus ex post application of the
function can lead to divergent assessment even where all the policy
choices involved are rank homogenous.
F. A Summary
What have we established in this Part? To begin, every equityregarding social welfare function is susceptible to ex ante/ex post divergence. For every such function, there will be some choice situations that are evaluated differently depending on whether the function is applied ex ante or ex post. Permuting policies provide a ready
recipe for generating ex ante/ex post divergence, since every equityregarding social welfare function assigns a greater ex ante value to a
permuting policy than its ex post value.
However, some social welfare functions are especially vulnerable
to ex ante/ex post divergence. Here, philosophical debates about
prioritarianism come into play. Prioritarianism corresponds (plausibly) to an additive equity-regarding social welfare function, which in
turn is one kind of strictly concave function. The popular Gini coefficient corresponds to a rank-weighted social welfare function, which is
not strictly concave. Rank-weighted functions are immune from ex
ante/ex post divergence if all the policies at stake are rank homogenous-that is, if there is no uncertainty about what any given individual's rank in the utility distribution will be. By contrast, strictly concave social welfare functions, including additive, prioritarian
functions, assign a greater ex ante than ex post value to every policy,
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and therefore can generate divergent choice
assessments even if all of
80
the policies at stake are rank-homogenous.
III.

COMPENSATION AND INSURANCE

This Part examines the extent to which ex post compensation by
the government and insurance by private individuals alleviate ex
ante/ex post divergence.
Section A considers ex post compensation by the government. It
shows that ex ante/ex post divergence is alleviated only if utility is
"freely transferable," not just across individuals (the usual result), but
also across states. When utility is not "doubly freely transferable," the
divergence remains an issue in two respects. First, the ex post planner
may regard as unjustifiably expensive the compensation that would be
required to assuage her concerns with a policy's ex post disequalizing
effects, concerns that her ex ante counterpart may not share. Second,
even if the ex post planner finds such compensation cost justified, so
that she comes into agreement with the ex ante planner regarding the
policy itself, she and her ex ante counterpart may disagree about the
propriety of the compensation, for which the ex ante planner may see
little purpose, but which is essential for the ex post planner to see the
policy as beneficial.
Building on these results, Section B discusses compensation from
a different angle quite relevant to current debates about relegating
equity considerations to tax law. What if we disaggregated social welfare analysis across levels of government? We hypothesize a special
soA

superficial reading of John Broome's work may suggest a contrary
result:
namely, that prioritarian social welfare functions are actually immune from ex ante/ex
post divergence and, in particular, are immune from a conflict between the ex post
approach and ex ante Pareto superiority. But, in fact, the difference between our results and Broome's work arises because-in the case of prioritarianism-the ex ante
approach can be conceptualized in different ways. In the case of a prioritarian function-one with the form p(u,)+...+p(u,)-it can be applied either ex ante (as we have
defined that) or "ex ante+." Ex ante+ means determining each individual's 9(ui) value
in each state, determining her expectations of these values, and summing these expectations. Clearly, the ex ante+ application of a prioritarian function and the ex post application will always converge. On these issues, see Rabinowicz, supra note 6, at 147-54.
We do not find the notion of an ex ante+ application of a social welfare function particularly compelling. The notion is simply inapplicable for comparativist social welfare
functions, and the more natural expression of ex ante egalitarianism and ex ante
Pareto superiority, we believe, looks to the vector of expected well-being associated
with each policy, not the vector of expectations of some concave transformation of
well-being. For these reasons, we do not further discuss the ex ante+ approach to equity regard in this Article.
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compensation agency (perhaps within the IRS, perhaps the legislature
itself). All other agencies are instructed to ignore equity and choose
the policy that maximizes the simple sum of utility across individuals.
The compensation agency, however, is given an equity-regarding social welfare function by the legislature and is told to implement equity
concerns as follows: for any chosen policy, the compensation agency
should adjust the policy using a compensation scheme that is optimal
in light of the equity-regarding function. Would this two-step disaggregated approach reliably produce policies that are at least as good
as those produced by a holistic, one-step application of the social welfare function? Absent free transferability of utility across individuals
and states, the answer is no. Without these special conditions, the twostep approach can yield lower social welfare.
Section C discusses private insurance, which may not only fail to
eliminate ex ante/ex post divergence, but may even frustrate governmental efforts to compensate policy losers.
A. Will CompensatingPolicy Losers Eliminate
the Ex Ante/Ex Post Divergence?
The ability to compensate policy losers from the winnings of policy winners may in certain special cases eliminate the divergence between ex post and ex ante social welfare. To see this, consider a simple case where there are two individuals and two equally likely states.
(The example is similar to the JANET and JOHN example in the Introduction.)81 Under the status quo, each individual receives 300 in
both states. The policy changes the possible outcomes to (200, 500)
and (500, 200). In other words, in the first state, individual 1 suffers a
loss (of 100) and individual 2 enjoys a greater gain (of 200). In the
second state, the individuals' roles are precisely reversed. Both individuals' expected utility is 350. The policy is ex ante Pareto superior
to the status quo and will therefore be favored by all ex ante planners
whatever their particular social welfare function. An equity-regarding
ex post planner, however, recognizing the certainty of ex post disequalization, might well disfavor the policy.
Now suppose that the winner in each state could compensate the
loser, leaving both better off. Imagine, for example, that the winner
could transfer a sufficient number of "utils" to the loser (150) to
eliminate the discrepancy in their utilities. With such transfers in

81See suprapp. 285-88.
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place, the ex post policy outcome in each state would be Pareto improving relative to the status quo (providing each individual an additional 50 utils). Hence, every Paretian ex post planner would now favor the policy (cum transfer). Since the same can still be said of every
Paretian ex ante planner, the divergence between ex ante and ex post
would be eliminated.
The question then is how far can we push this example. Under
what conditions does compensation eliminate the divergence between
ex ante and ex post social welfare? We highlight two necessary conditions that by themselves seem exceptional enough to tilt the balance
toward concluding that compensation cannot eliminate the issues we
have highlighted thus far in the paper.
1. Free Transferability of Utility Across Individuals
One implicit assumption in the example above is that a unit of
utility can be taken from the winner and given to the loser with no loss
of utility along the way. In general, compensation is capable of eliminating ex ante/ex post divergence only if utility is "freely transferable"
across individuals. (We discuss free transferability across states below.)
Utility is freely transferable across individuals (within a given state) if
we may "transfer" units of utility from any individual to any other individual without changing the total utility in that state in the process.
To see why freely transferable utility matters, let us return to the
initial example. Suppose now that the transfer "bucket" is leaky, so
that for every util leaving one person, only one-third of a util arrives at
the other person. (Below we describe why the bucket might leak in
this way.) Thus, within each state, every util taken from the winner
and transferred (in part) to the loser reduces the utility distance between them by one (the winner's utility reduction) plus one-third (the
loser's utility increase). But it does this at a cost of two-thirds in total
utility across the two individuals, since only one-third of the transferor's utility loss makes it to the transferee. This trade-off between
inequality reduction and total utility might not be acceptable to an
equity-regarding social planner. In other words, the policy, even when
combined with any transfer under such terms, might still be ex post
welfare reducing.
But even if transfers of utility between the two individuals on those
terms are capable of bringing the ex post planner around to the policy (cum transfer), imperfect transfers still may not eliminate the divergence between ex post and ex ante social welfare analysis. The dis-
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agreement will merely be relocated. The ex ante social planner may
well prefer not to make the kind of costly transfer necessary to make
the policy acceptable to the ex post planner.
This is easiest to see in the special case where the transfer is restricted to be the same across the two states. In that case, the transfer
reduces both individuals' expected utilities and so reduces (Paretian)
ex ante social welfare. To wit, in return for every util taken from individual 1 when he is the winner (in the second state), the same individual 1 receives only 1/3 of a util when he is the loser (in the first
state). The states being equally likely, individual l's expected utility
changes by (1/2)(1/3) + (1/2)(-1) = -1/3 for each unit taken from
the winner (simultaneously in both states). By the symmetry of the
example, the same is true for individual 2. The same logic can be
82
generalized beyond the special case of equal transfers across states.
Why might the bucket leak? The simplest answer is that there are
administrative costs. Every practical means of transferring across individuals-such as unemployment insurance, disability insurance, litigation, welfare policy, and taxation-involves the expenditure of substantial social resources in administration.
Another reason that the bucket might leak concerns differences
in marginal utilities for the transfer medium. Utility per se is never
physically transferred. Rather, some resource-a medium of transfer-is what passes between the individuals. The marginal utility of
this medium may vary across individuals.
Suppose, in particular, that the loser in each state not only suffers
a drop in the level of his utility, but also a decline in his marginal utility of money. If losses are purely economic, a drop in marginal utility
is admittedly unlikely, given the usual assumption of declining marginal utility of income. On the other hand, it is also unlikely that all
losses are economic. We might well imagine, for example, that the
losses caused by the policy are health related and that the suffered
condition reduces the marginal utility of money, as when the loser
dies or becomes vegetative. It might well be, then, that the loser's
marginal utility of money is 1/3 that of the winner in each state.
In general, a positive correlation between those who lose under
the policy (more precisely, those whom we would like to compensate) 83 and those whose marginal utility of money decreases under the

82
83

See infra Part III.A.3 for more general comments regarding this point.
These individuals may differ when the status quo exhibits inequality, as when

the loser under the policy is still better off than the winner.
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policy-a special problem for policies whose losses are predominantly
nonmonetary-has the potential to render monetary compensation
cost ineffective at mitigating the ex post disequalizing effects of a policy, and thus incapable of closing the gap between ex ante and ex post
social welfare analysis.
A third reason why the bucket might leak concerns the information problems associated with knowing whom to tax and whom to
compensate, a problem that has spawned whole literatures in economics, including a broad discourse on "optimal taxation." 4 When taxes
and transfers can be made contingent only on individuals' observable
choices, as opposed to the unobservable characteristics that drive
those choices, such taxes and transfers will distort economic choices
and thus cause efficiency losses.
2. Free Transferability of Utility Across States
Even if utility is freely transferable across individuals, there still
may be divergence between ex ante and ex post social welfare if utility
is not also freely transferable across states. Utility is freely transferable
across states (for a given individual) if it is possible to transfer that individual's utility in one state into utility for that individual in another
state without changing that individual's expected utility across states.
For example, if two states have the same probability, then free transferability across states implies that we can transfer utility for this individual, one for one, between these states. If the first state is twice as
likely to occur, then free transferability across states implies that we
can transfer two units of utility into the second state for every one we
take from the first.
The government's means of transfer across states is its ability to
force its citizens to "insure" against utility losses, where insurance is
broadly defined to include trading across states of the world. s5 The
government might force payment of an "insurance premium" in the
form of a tax imposed upon the individual in states where her utility is
high, paying out the "insurance proceeds" to the individual in the
form of a government transfer in the states where her utility is low.86

84

See, e.g., Stern, supra note 24, at 27-46 (reviewing the theory of optimal
taxa-

tion).

85 Because insurance is a trade, we can
reciprocally view the government as forcing
citizens to sell insurance to it.
86 We consider private insurance and how it affects the government's ability to do

this infra Part III.C.
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A more specific example is government-provided health care financed
by progressive taxes. Note that these are, of course, examples of some
transferability across states, not necessarily free transferability. Free
transferability requires that the expected value of premiums equal the
expected value of payouts.
Free transferability across states is necessary for the convergence
of ex ante and ex post social choice in the same way that it is necessary
for a risk-averse individual to act as if she is risk neutral. When insurance policies are available that permit free transferability across states,
the individual judges uncertainties solely by their expected value, anticipating the purchase of insurance. With free transferability across
states, the state judges policies by their effects on expected utility, anticipating the imposition of insurance on individuals.
To make this concrete, consider a two-state/two-individual example wherein the individuals' utilities are equal to each other both in a
certain status quo and in each of two equally likely states. Suppose
that the individuals' utility falls by 100 in the first state and increases
by 200 in the second. The policy increases both individuals' expected
utility by 50 and so is again ex ante Pareto improving. But the level of
individual welfare and total welfare is risky-these vary across statesand an equity-regarding ex post policymaker may be sensitive to this
kind of riskiness. In particular, if the social welfare function is such
that the marginal impact of individual utility is diminishing, the ex
post social planner may find the policy to be social welfare reducing.
This would occur if the loss of 100, acting on lower levels of welfare
where each utility unit is relatively dear, counts for more than the gain
of 200, acting on higher levels of welfare where each utility unit has a
relatively low impact.
If, however, the government could force individuals to insure
against the bad outcome in the first state, then the ex post planner
would also favor the policy. Suppose, for instance, that the government could purchase insurance from Lloyd's of London that enables
it to raise each individual's welfare by 150 in the first state in return
for lowering each individual's welfare by 150 in the second state. (Because the individuals' fates are correlated, the government would
need to access an external insurer of some kind.) In that case, the
policy is Pareto improving in each state, increasing individual utilities
each by 50. Hence, it would be approved by an ex post planner.
However, just as in the case of intrastate transfers across individuals, disagreements will remain so long as interstate transfers are at all
costly-which they might be for similar reasons. While the ex post
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planner will not, by hypothesis, favor the policy without interstate
transfers, the ex ante planner will disfavor adding any leaky transfer to
the policy. Even if only one util is lost in transit across states, so that
for each individual 150 utils are transferred away from the good outcome and 149 toward the bad, expected utility for both individuals
decreases by 1/2, and the move is ex ante Pareto inferior. The general case is again worked out in the Appendix.
3. General Case
In the Appendix, we show that if utility is freely transferable across
individuals and across states, and if policies are ranked by their maximal attainable social welfare when combined with feasible transfers,
then ex ante social welfare analysis generates the same ranking of social policies as ex post social welfare.
The proof proceeds in two steps. First, we show that "double free
transferability" renders any social welfare function, whether applied
ex post or ex ante, ordinally equivalent to utilitarianism, similarly applied. This generalizes, to the case of uncertainty, a well-known result
regarding the free transferability of utility across individuals in a deterministic setting. Next, we rehearse the well-known result from Harsanyi that ex post utilitarianism is fully equivalent to ex ante."'
Examples such as those above suffice to establish the converse
proposition that no such ordinal equivalence obtains when either
form of free transferability does not hold. More general comments
regarding the converse are also possible. First, as shown in Appendix
Section I, a Paretian equity-regarding ex ante planner would never
agree to a costly transfer, however small the cost, starting from an initial position of ex ante equality. This is because the ex ante effect of
every costly transfer scheme can be decomposed into two ex ante welfare-reducing changes in the expected utility vector: (1) a (Pareto inferior) reduction in some individuals' expected utility, and (2) a zero
sum transfer from these individuals to the rest. The latter zero sum
transfer will be ex ante disequalizing if the individuals begin with
identical expected utilities.
On the other hand, equal expected utility does not mean equal ex
post utility in any given state. And, depending on the relationship between equity regard and transfer costs, the ex ante planner's ex post

87

See supra note 58.
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counterpart might well consider a costly transfer worthwhile if it
equalized ex post utilities.
More generally, even if we do not start from a position of perfect
equality ex ante, the ex ante planner will generally be less willing than
her ex post counterpart to pay for costly ex post transfers to the extent
that the equity effects of these transfers wash out ex ante. Thus, suppose that individual utilities in two equally probable states are (150,
200) and (250, 100), so that the first individual is better off ex ante.
The ex post planner might be willing to institute a costly transfer that
in each state takes, for example, 25 utils from the individual who is
better off in that state and gives 24 to the other individual. But the ex
ante planner will see no point in making this transfer, for its positive
ex post equity effects wash out ex ante, leaving only an equal reduction in each individual's ex ante utility of 1/2 util.
B. The Suboptimality of CompartmentalizingEquity Concerns
This Section asks a different question about compensation-one
that relates to the division of institutional responsibility for equity.
Imagine that regulatory bodies and other governmental agencies generally ignore equity, and simply maximize total utility."8 A set of transfers is then arranged by the legislature or a specialized body. This
body applies an equity-regarding social welfare function, using the ex
post approach, and chooses a set of transfers that is optimal, given this
function and this approach. Will those transfers overcome any possible divergence between total utility and equity that might arise? More
precisely: if the regulatory body is faced with a choice between P and
P', such that utilitarianism favors P, but ex post application of an equity-regarding social welfare function favors P', is it necessarily the
case that ex post application of that same social welfare function
would rank P optimally modified by the compensation body as better
(or at least no worse) than P' similarly modified?
The answer to this question is straightforward, given the connection between utilitarianism, double free transferability, and equity re88The point we make in this Section applies as well under conditions of certainty,
and so is not directly related to the ex ante/ex post problem. We include it because it
is of interest to legal scholars and because it is an immediate implication of the analysis
in the previous Section. A standard claim in law and economics is that distributive
considerations are best handled by the tax system. This Section undermines that
claim. See generally Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale,
86 CORNELL L. REv. 1003 (2001) (describing, and criticizing, the view that legal rules
should ignore distributive considerations).
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gard discussed in Part III.A above and demonstrated in the Appendix.
For any equity-regarding social welfare function, the following two
propositions are true. First, given free transferability of utility within
and across states, the ex post ranking of P and P' conjoined with optimal transfers is the same as the utilitarian ranking of Pand P', for all
P and P'. Thus, double free transferability enables the institutional
separation of efficiency and equity. Conversely, without double free
transferability, there will be some pairs of policies P and P' such that
the utilitarian criterion prefers P, but the ex post application of the
social welfare function prefers P' optimally modified by the compensation body to P optimally modified.
In other words, absent the special conditions of double free transferability, the following scenario can occur: The utilitarian regulatory
agency chooses one policy over an alternative; the compensation body
then arranges compensation to maximize society's equity-regarding
social welfare function, but produces a worse result than if the regulatory agency had been sensitive to equity and chosen the alternative
(perhaps subsequently optimized by the compensation body). Absent
double free transferability, the institutional separation of efficiency
and equity may lead to some choices that reduce social welfare.
C. PrivateInsurance
One might wonder whether individuals' purchase of private insurance helps to mitigate the divergence between ex post and ex ante
evaluation. Returning to our earlier example with two individuals and
two possible states, each individual might purchase private insurance
against the state in which she is the loser. Suppose, for example, that
fair insurance is available. Therefore, individual 1 might insure
against her 100 utility loss in the first state by buying an insurance policy that pays her in that state in return for a "premium" paid in the
second state. The hope might even be that private insurance of this
kind would make up for the likely shortcomings of government transfers, both between individuals and between states, as discussed above.
But this story relies on individuals purchasing insurance in a way
that pleases the ex post social planner. In fact, there is no reason to
think that they would. Indeed, the most important point to make
about private insurance is that it may work against the government's
attempts to alleviate a policy's ex post disequalizing effects.
In the canonical example, for instance, the ex post planner is
concerned with individuals' low utility states and would like to see
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them transfer resources to those states through private insurance
markets. But why would individuals make their insurance decisions
on the basis of the level of their utility? In particular, why would they
strive to transfer utility from high to low utility states, as the planner
would prefer? If individuals are expected utility maximizers, they
would rather strive to transfer resources away from states with low
marginal utility for the transfer medium (say, money) and toward
states with high marginal utility. Once again, the correlation between
utility levels and the marginal utility of the transfer medium is a crucial factor. If the low marginal utility states are also low utility level
states-as with some health-related losses-then expected utilitymaximizing individuals will use private insurance markets to shift resources toward high utility states, contrary to the desire of the ex post
planner.
Indeed, private insurance might even undo the government's efforts at reallocating across states. We have already noted the importance of the government's ability to transfer utility across states. With
private insurance readily available, the government's transfer of utility
to a given state can be undone by individuals. Individuals will rearrange this transfer by moving it to where they prefer, as opposed to
where the ex post planner prefers. If the level of utility and the marginal utility of money are correlated, then (under certain plausible
conditions) s9 the individual would use government compensation to
purchase insurance in such a configuration that the net effect of the
compensation would be to increase utility in high utility states more
than in low utility states. That is, the individual would rearrange the
government compensation in such a way that the compensation
makes matters worse for the ex post social planner. In the canonical
example, individual 1 will shift any government compensation paid in
the first state, where she is the loser, toward the second state, where
she is the winner.
IV. Ex ANTE PARETO SUPERIORITY VERSUS Ex POST SOCIAL WELFARE

We have focused to this point on the possible divergence of ex
post and ex ante assessments. Let us now return to the possible conflict between ex post assessments and Pareto superiority.

89

The assumption is that the individuals' absolute risk aversion is not increasing,

which is an implication of constant relative risk aversion.
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First, it should be underscored that the conflict is with ex ante
Pareto superiority. Our focus, throughout this Article, is on the class
of equity-regarding social welfare functions that respect the Pareto
principle. These functions generate orderings of outcomes such that
a Pareto superior outcome is necessarily ranked above a Pareto inferior outcome.
Second, because the equity-regarding social welfare functions that
we are interested in respect the Pareto principle for outcomes, both
ex ante and ex post applications of such functions under conditions of
uncertainty guarantee the selection of policies that are ex post Pareto
superior. One policy-that is, one lottery over outcomes-is ex post
Pareto superior to another policy if the outcome of the first policy in
each possible state of the world is Pareto superior to the outcome of
the second policy in that state. Pareto superiority in this sense is respected by the ex post approach to social choice, as well as by the ex
ante approach.
Further, it should be stressed that cases of ex ante/ex post divergence in policy choice are not necessarily cases in which the ex ante
preferred policy is Pareto superior. In some cases of divergence, the
policy preferred by ex ante application of the social welfare function
will be ex ante Pareto incomparable to the other policy rather than ex
ante Pareto superior. In other words, there will be some individuals
who have greater expected utility with the ex ante preferred policy,
but others who have lower expected utility.
On the other hand, it is obvious that-because the social welfare
function is Paretian-a policy that is ex ante Pareto superior relative
to some alternative must be preferred by ex ante application of the
social welfare function. The upshot, then, is that the conflict between ex
ante Pareto superiority and ex post valuation is a subset of the general ex
ante/ex post divergence. Of all possible choice situations in which ex
ante and ex post applications of a given social welfare function diverge-recommending different policies-a proper subset are choice
situations in which ex post application of the social welfare function
recommends a policy that is ex ante Pareto inferior to some alternative.
How general is the ex ante/ex post Pareto superior conflict?
Bracketing the possibility of insurance and compensation, it is easy to
show that every equity-regarding social welfare function is susceptible
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to this conflict.90 We can demonstrate this using the notion of a permuting policy, discussed above in Part II.D. As mentioned there, every
equity-regarding social welfare function gives a greater ex ante than ex
post valuation to any permuting policy. 9' Take any permuting policy
with the following particular characteristics: each possible permutation of the utility vector corresponds to one and only one possible
outcome, and the probability of each outcome is the same. Assume
that the ex ante social welfare valuation of the policy is s and the ex
post is r < s. Because this is a permuting policy, mean utility across individuals within every state is the same (k). Because the possible outcome vectors have equal probability, and all permutations are accounted for, each individual's expected utility is also k. Next,
construct a policy where every individual is certain to get k. The ex
ante valuation of this alternative is s, as it is for the original permuting
policy. The ex post valuation must be greater than r, because the policy equalizes with mean preservation in every state. Indeed, the ex
post valuation must also be s,since the policy can lead to only one utility vector (k for each individual) and thus must have the same ex post
and ex ante valuations. Now alter this certain-outcome policy by subtracting a small amount (d) from each individual's utility, so that each
individual receives k - d. If d is small enough, the ex post and ex ante
valuation of this new policy will be greater than r, but less than s.9'
Thus, the new policy will be ex post preferred to the original permuting policy, but ex ante dispreferred. Further, because individuals are
perfectly symmetric, the original permuting policy 3 must be not only
ex ante preferred, but also ex ante Pareto superior.9
More specifically, this result holds for all continuous equity-regarding social welfare functions.
91 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
92 This assumes that the social welfare function is continuous in
the vector of individual utilities, so that a small change in that vector produces a small change in the social welfare function value.
93 This result is an implication of Harsanyi's theorem, see supra note 58 and accompanying text, combined with the assumption of continuity. Stated in contraposition formulation, Harsanyi proved that, if the social welfare function is not an affine
function of individual utilities (the case with an equity-regarding social welfare function), then there exist two policies to which all expected-utility-maximizing individuals
are indifferent, but one of which the social planner strictly prefers to the other. Adding the continuity of the social welfare function, the conclusion here implies the existence of two policies, one that is strictly preferred by all individuals, and another that is
strictly preferred by the social planner. Take the indifferent pair of policies given to us
by Harsanyi and reduce each individual's utility in the socially preferred policy by an
amount small enough not to upset the social ranking. All individuals will now strictly
disprefer the modified policy that the planner strictly prefers.
90
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For reasons discussed in Part III above, government compensation
and private insurance may well be ineffective at closing the gap between ex ante Pareto superiority and ex post welfare valuation. Compensation, for example, would affect the argument above only if it
were capable of raising the ex post valuation of the uncertain policy to
equal that of the certain policy. But if the "bucket leaks" sufficiently,
compensation might well be ineffective at this task. Compensation
might be capable of increasing the ex post valuation only somewhator perhaps not at all.
In sum, the ex post application of any equity-regarding social welfare function will produce a conflict with ex ante Pareto superiority,
in some choice situations, even if social and individual probability assessments are identical (which we are assuming throughout the Article). This is true even with insurance and government compensation
in play (unless utility is fully and freely transferable across individuals
and states).
This conclusion may seem a reductio ad absurdum of the ex post
approach. Many scholars-certainly mainly legal scholars-reflexively
assume that ex ante Pareto superior rules, institutions, or other policies must be normatively attractive.94 The ex post approach entails the
possibility of conflict with ex ante Pareto superiority, while the ex ante
approach guarantees that a conflict will not arise. Is that not a decisive argument for the ex ante approach? Now that we have a better
appreciation of the nature of ex ante and ex post evaluation, let us
turn to this crucial question.
V. WHAT IS THE CORRECT APPROACH TO WELFARIST SOCIAL CHOICE
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: Ex POST OR Ex ANTE?

The utilitarian social welfare function necessarily produces convergence of ex ante and ex post assessments. Assuming that the social
planner and all individuals in the population assign the same probabilities to outcomes, there can never arise a choice situation in which
ex post and ex ante application of the utilitarian social welfare function select different policies. But the egalitarian case against utilitarianism-the case for a shift to some kind of equity-regarding social welfare function-is powerful. It is this shift that requires a choice
between ex ante and ex post approaches to social decision making
See Matthew D. Adler, The Puzzle of "Ex Ante Efficiency ": Does RationalApprovability
Have Moral Weight, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1255, 1255 n. 1 (2003) (citing sources of law and
economics work that "explicitly invoke [] the criterion of 'ex ante efficiency"').
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under uncertainty. As we have fleshed out in detail in preceding
Parts, any equity-regarding social welfare function (as defined by the
Pigou-Dalton condition) 95 leads to divergence of ex ante and ex post
evaluation in some choice situations. Further, in a subset of these
choice situations, a conflict between ex post evaluation and ex ante
Pareto superiority will arise.
So which approach is correct? The case for the ex post approach
relies on the "sure-thing principle." More precisely, it rests on the applicability of the sure-thing principle at the level of social choice-as a
constraint on the choices of the social planner. In Section A, we describe the sure-thing principle and explain why it demands the ex post
approach. In Sections B and C, we defend the principle itself. We
show, in particular, that a social planner who violates the sure-thing
principle is apt to be disturbingly, irrationally inconsistent over time.
A. The Connection Between the Sure-ThingPrinciple
and the Ex Post Approach
The sure-thing principle can be formulated in different ways, all
of which are logically equivalent-or at least imply each other given
further basic axioms. 9" Our formulation of the sure-thing principle
(at the level of social choice) will be as follows: Given two policies, P
and Q, which have the same probability of producing two outcomes
that the social welfare function ranks as equally good, changing that
probability (making equiproportional compensating changes in the
probabilities of other states, but without changing anything else about
the policies) or substituting two other equally good outcomes for the
original outcomes (without changing anything else about the policies)
should not change the ranking of the policies.
Table 6: The Sure-Thing Principle

Policy P
Policy

Q

State A

State B

0

0+

O'

0++

See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., BROOME, supra note 6, at 90-120 (discussing the sure-thing principle in
the context of expected utility theory); KREPS, supra note 9, at 103-04 (discussing treatment of the sure-thing principle by Savage, Anscombe, and Aumann).
95

96
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Referring to Table 6 above, imagine that the social planner prefers policy P to policy Q; that states A and B have probabilities z and
(1 - z) respectively; and that the social welfare function assigns equal
value to outcomes 0+ and O++. 0+ and O++ might be identical utility
vectors; or they might be reorderings of each other; or they might be
wholly distinct vectors that the social welfare function ranks as equally
good. Then if z is changed to y, the social planner must prefer the altered P to the altered Q. Similarly, if 0* and O** are substituted for
0+ and O++, respectively, and 0* and O** are equally good outcomes,
then the planner must prefer the altered P to the altered Q. If instead
the social planner is initially indifferent between P and Q then after a
substitution of y for z or 0* and 0** for 0+ and 0++, the planner must
remain indifferent between the altered policies.
It is immediately obvious that the ex post approach to social
choice satisfies the sure-thing principle. This is because the ex post
formula is additively separable across outcomes. It takes the form
pAw(OA(P)) + pBw(OB(P)) +... ,where pA is the probability of state A
and OA (P) is the outcome of state A given policy P. If this additive
formula ranks one policy over another, increasing the probability of
some state with indifferent outcomes across the policies (with an equiproportional compensating change in the probabilities of other
states), or changing the w values of the indifferent outcomes, will not
alter the ranking.
A somewhat less obvious, but crucial, point is that ex ante application of an equity-regarding social welfare function necessarily violates
the sure-thing principle. The reason implicates our discussion in Part
II.A, above, of precisely why it is that ex post and ex ante welfare values can diverge. Suppose we take a given policy and change the utility
vector in some state A, transferring 1 unit of utility from individual 1
to individual 2. Suppose further that we change the utility vector in
no other state. The sure-thing principle demands that the social welfare status of this state A change be independent of the utility vectors
in the unaltered states B, C, D, ....
But this will not be the case in an
ex ante calculation of social welfare. The transfer in state A effects, as
we have previously noted, a transfer of P A 1 units of expected utility
from individual 1 to individual 2. If this equalizes expected utilities,
then the transfer improves ex ante social welfare, given equity regard.
If it disequalizes expected utilities, it lowers ex ante social welfare.
Whether it is equalizing or disequalizing depends on whether individual l's expected utility was initially larger or smaller than individual
2's. This, in turn, depends-and this is the point-not only on utili-
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If initial utilities in state A but also on utilities in states B, C, D ....
ties in A, B, C, D,... are such that individual 1 starts out with greater
expected utility than individual 2, then the transfer in state A is ex
with vectors
ante equalizing. Replace the utility vectors in B, C, D ....
that are different enough to make individual 2's expected utility initially greater, and the transfer in state A is now ex ante disequalizing.
A different way to see why the ex ante approach violates the surething principle draws on our above analysis of ex ante/ex post divergence in the ranking of permuting policies.97 Take any permuting
policy. As noted, any equity-regarding social welfare function must assign the permuting policy a greater ex ante than ex post valuation.
Reorder the vectors in each state so that individuals are ranked the
same across states in terms of their utility levels. The sure-thing principle (coupled with symmetry) requires that the planner be indifferent between the permuting policy and the reordering. This condition
is met for the ex post social planner but not for the ex ante planner.
The ex post valuation of the reordering is the same as the ex post
valuation of the original permuting policy, because the reordering
does not change anything for the ex post calculation. Thus, the ex
post planner is indeed indifferent between the two policies. However,
because the reordering has the same utility vector in each state, the
new policy has no uncertainty, and its ex ante value must equal its ex
post value. Therefore, the ex ante value of the permuting policy must
exceed the ex ante value of the reordering. So a social planner following the ex ante approach will prefer the permuting policy to the
reordering, in violation of the sure-thing principle. 98
For that analysis, see supra Part II.D.
The sure-thing principle represents a strongly consequentialist approach to social choice. As we explained earlier, see supra note 19 and accompanying text, both the
ex ante and ex post application of a social welfare function are weakly consequentialist,
in the sense that the ranking of a policy is wholly determined by its possible outcomes,
and that two policies yielding identical utility (i.e., well-being) vectors in any given state
must be ranked as equal. The sure-thing principle is more robustly consequentialist
than this. To understand the point, it is crucial to see that outcomes can be nonidentical-in the sense that the well-being of some particular individuals varies-but
equally good. The utility vector (1, 0, 0, 1) is identical to itself; it is equally good as,
but not identical to, the vector (0, 1, 1, 0), because the identity of the individuals who
end up at utility levels 0 and 1 is varied. In short, reorderings of a utility vector, given
the symmetry principle, always yield equally good but nonidentical vectors. And, if the
social welfare function is the sum of the square root of utility, the vector (1, 0, 0, 1) is
equally good as-but clearly not identical to-the vector (4, 0, 0, 0). The sure-thing
principle says, in effect, that all that matters about a state-conditional outcome is its
goodness. Swapping one possible outcome of an uncertain choice for an equally good
outcome (albeit one in which particular individuals may achieve different levels of
97
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B. Is the Sure-ThingPrincipleAttractive?
We have not yet defended the sure-thing principle at the level of
social choice. We have simply clarified that the ex post approach satisfies this principle, while the ex ante approach violates it.
Should we accept the sure-thing principle at the level of social
choice? It should be stressed that the issue here is normative, not descriptive. Much empirical work in political science and psychology has
shown that the principle has tenuous descriptive credentials in tracking the actual behavior of governments or individuals. 9 But here we
are asking: how should governmental officials behave? Is the most attractive normative account of governmental choice under conditions
of uncertainty one that embraces the sure-thing principle?
As already explained, the proponent of the ex ante approach must
answer "no" to this question. That puts the ex ante proponent in an
uncomfortable position. At least as typically formulated, the ex ante
approach rejects the sure-thing principle at the level of social choice,
but embraces it at the level of individual well-being. Why? Remember
that the ex ante approach applies the social welfare function to individual expected utilities. In other words, it assumes that the ranking of
different policies for a given individual can be determined by using
the standard expected utility formula, multiplying the probability of
each possible outcome by the utility of the outcome for that individual, and then adding up the results. Given two policies, which in
some state will produce outcomes that are equally good for a given
individual, the sure-thing principle stipulates that changing the probability of the state (with equiproportional compensating changes in
the probabilities of other states), or substituting another pair of outcomes that are equally good for that individual, must not alter the

well-being) should leave the decision maker indifferent. And altering a pair of policies
by exchanging a pair of equally good state-conditional outcomes in some state with
another such pair should leave the decision maker with the same ranking of the policies. The ex post approach is consistent with these strongly consequentialist axioms,
while the ex ante approach is not.
99 A basic result in expected utility theory is that, if an
individual's preferences satisfy the sure-thing principle plus a few other very basic axioms, her choices can be represented as maximizing the expectation of some utility function. But much work in
psychology and empirical economics, going back to Allais, shows that individuals often
do not behave as if they are maximizing the expectation of some utility function. See,
e.g., REID HASTIE & ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD:
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 289 (2001) (surveying scholarship on human decision making and concluding that "subjective expected utility theory is not a valid descriptive theory of human behavior").
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ranking of the policies for that individual. Indeed, the expected utility formula for individual well-being satisfies this requirement.
The question at hand, then, is not whether we should wholly reject
the sure-thing principle. Rather, the question is whether we should
adopt a hybrid position, as the ex ante approach does, accepting the
sure-thing principle at the level of individual but not social choice; or
instead wholly embrace the principle, accepting it at both levels-as
the ex post approach does. Arguments that flatly deny the rational
force of the sure-thing principle do not, in fact, provide ammunition
for the defender of the ex ante approach. 0 0 What she needs, instead,
are more nuanced arguments, which would show that the principle is
a rational constraint on individuals but not on society as a whole.
1. Diamond's Example
Is it possible to bite the bullet and defend the ex ante approach by
rejecting the sure-thing principle at the level of social choice, but embracing it at the level of individual well-being? Yes. Indeed, this is just
the strategy that the economist Peter Diamond suggests in a wellknown article criticizing Harsanyi's argument for utilitarianism.'0 '
Diamond provides the following as a counterexample to the surething principle at the level of social choice:

10 In fact, we believe that the case for the sure-thing principle at the level of individual choice-again, as a normative, not a descriptive principle-is powerful. The
argument against the individual-level principle sometimes invokes a preference for
certainty. Imagine that (x, y, z) is a lottery, which yields the individual utility x in the
first possible state, y in the second, and z in the third. It is alleged that an individual
might rationally prefer (5, 3, 1) to (4, 4, 1) but (4, 4, 4) to (5, 3, 4) in violation of the
sure-thing principle, giving extra weight to the certainty that (4, 4, 4) provides. But
this certainty will either be reflected in the individual's mental states in the different
outcomes, in which case the correct vector would be (4+c, 4+c, 4+c), where c is the individual's benefit from knowing what the benefit would be; or it will not be, in which
the preferences just described are irrational. See BROOME, supra note 6, at 97-98. Note
also that violating the sure-thing principle at the level of individual choice would lead
to time inconsistency, for the same reason that doing so at the level of social choice
does. See infra Part V.B.2-3 (introducing and discussing the concept of time inconsistency).
However, because the ex ante approach and the ex post approach disagree about
the sure-thing principle at the level of social choice, not individual choice, our defense
of the sure-thing principle, below, will focus on the social level.
101See Peter A. Diamond, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal
Comparison of Utility: Comment, 75J. POL. ECON. 765 (1967).
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2

State A
p =.5

State B
p =.5

Expected
Utilities

Policy P

(1,0)

(1,0)

(1,0)

Policy Q

(1, 0)

(0, 1)

(1/2, 1/2)

Diamond points out that the sure-thing principle plus welfarism
and anonymity/symmetry require that the social planner be indifferent between the two policies. Welfarism with anonymity/symmetry
requires that the planner be indifferent between outcomes (i.e., utility
vectors) (1, 0) and (0, 1). Therefore, the sure-thing principle requires
that substituting one for the other in state B, without changing the
outcome in state A, not change the planner's assessment of social welfare. The social welfare impact of making individual 2, rather than
individual 1, the beneficiary in state B (as happens in switching from
policy P to policy Q) should be nil. In particular, it should not turn
on which individual is the beneficiary in state A.
Diamond claims, quite tersely, that this conclusion is counterintuitive. Policy Q "seems strictly preferable to me," he says, "since it gives
[the second individual] a fair shake while [policy P] does not"-as captured by the equality of expected utilities under Q but not P. 0 3 Diamond concludes: "I am willing to accept the sure-thing principle for
individual choice but not for social choice, since it seems reasonable
for the individual to be concerned solely with final states while society
is also interested in the process of choice."' 4
We find Diamond's argument, such as it is, unpersuasive, for reasons elaborated by John Broome. Diamond appeals to "fairness"specifically, a concern for a "fair process"-as a grounds for preferring the ex ante approach to the ex post. But in fact, "fair process"
concerns, if persuasive, move us beyond welfarism and argue against
both the determination of social choice by ex post application of a so102

This table does not conform to the matrix representation of policies that we

introduced earlier in the Article. Nevertheless, its meaning should be clear.
103 Diamond, supra note 101, at 766.
104 Id. A similar sentiment is expressed in Roger B. Myerson, Utilitarianism,Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems, 49 ECONOMETRICA 883, 884
(1981).
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cial welfare function and the determination of social choice by ex ante
application of a social welfare function. The sort of information incorporated by a social welfare function-namely, the different utility
(well-being) vectors that would occur in different possible statesleaves out the sort of nonwelfarist procedural facts to which a fairness
assessment would be sensitive. The fact that ex ante utilities are equal,
and the fact that individuals have been treated fairly, coincide only
haphazardly.
Broome provides the following sort of example. °0 Imagine that
Diamond's Table represents the allocation of an indivisible item between two individuals, who are equally "deserving" of it. The individual who gets the item will receive utility 1; the other individual will receive utility 0. Imagine that a fair coin is flipped and the first
individual has won the flip. We now consider two "policies": giving
the valuable item to the first individual, or flipping the coin again.
Giving the valuable item to the first individual corresponds to policy P
in the table; flipping the coin again corresponds to policy Q. Policy Q
equalizes expected utilities; P does not. But, intuitively, Q is no fairer
than P. By what theory of "fair process" is flipping a coin twice fairer
than flipping it once? To engage in "fair process" means to follow
some stipulated procedure, perhaps a randomizing one, for allocating
benefits and burdens. Once the procedure has been run, the "policy"
of conforming to the allocation chosen by the procedure (policy P in
this case) may well fail to equalize expected utilities, relative to some
other policy (in particular, the policy of rerunning the procedure).
Another way to put the point is that anyone who believes in "fair procedure" must imagine a procedure that ends at some juncture, producing an allocation-and at that juncture, the "fair" policy and Diamond's policy of equalizing expected utilities will diverge.
Alternatively, imagine that the social planner has not done anything yet to allocate the item. The first individual is evidently shorter
than the second. Neither is evidently less Semitic. 106 Moreover, both
are equally likely to turn out to be the least Semitic upon further investigation. The social planner is choosing between policy P (which
says to allocate the item to the shorter individual) and policy Q (which
says to undertake genealogical research and allocate the item to the
individual who turns out to have less Jewish ancestry). Could one still
then argue that P is less fair than Q because Q equalizes expected utili-

105John Broome, Uncertainty and Fairness,94 ECON.J. 624, 628 (1984).

106Again, this example is based on Broome's article. See id.
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ties? At best, both policies are equally arbitrary and "unfair." Indeed,
one might argue from the comparative history of discrimination
against tall people and people of Semitic origin, that Qis less fair than
P. The point is that the decision criteria themselves drive fairness.
The fact that application of one of the criteria in this case is initially
uncertain seems irrelevant.
In short, the defender of the ex ante approach needs an argument that is welfaist-one that accepts that outcomes can be represented by utility vectors, thus summarizing only welfare information
and ignoring nonwelfare facts-and that further shows why the surething principle applies at the level of individual well-being, but not at
the level of social choice. Diamond's argument, by appealing to fairness concerns that (if cogent) move us beyond welfarism, does not fit
the bill.
2. Welfare Contractarianism
Is there any argument that would fit the bill? Perhaps. We can
imagine a kind of welfarist and "contractarian" defense of the ex ante
approach that would satisfy the conditions just articulated. It would
say the following: (1) Social choices should be evaluated by asking
what the affected individuals would hypothetically agree to. (2) Each
individual is assumed to care only about her own well-being. (3) The
determination of individual well-being under conditions of uncertainty satisfies the sure-thing principle (i.e., equals expected individual utility). (4) Social choice should respect ex ante Pareto superiority, because individuals would contract to ex ante Pareto superior
policies. (5) Social choice among policies that are ex ante Pareto incomparable should be determined using a social welfare function applied to expected utilities.
Contractarian approaches to social choice are, of course, worth
serious consideration. They have their roots in Locke and Hobbes
and were revitalized in modern political theory by John Rawls. But it
is not clear whether this philosophical tradition in fact provides the
resources to defend the kind of welfare contractarianism that the ex
ante approach represents. Rawls himself is not a welfarist, 1°7 nor is

107Rawls focuses on the distribution of "primary goods," such as income,
rather
than on the distribution of well-being itself. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 92
(1971). This may seem like a small difference, but, in fact, the divide between theorists
who see well-being as the "currency" for distributive justice and theorists who see "primary goods," "resources," "capabilities," or other such constructs as the correct "cur-
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Tim Scanlon, the most prominent living contractarian philosopher,
who stresses that individuals in actual or hypothetical contracting scenarios might well have non-self-interested aims.'0 ° In short, the proponent of the ex ante approach who defends it as a variant of contractarianism must show that-pace the leading contemporary
contractarians-contractarianism is best specified along welfarist
lines.
Perhaps this showing can be made. But the proponent of the ex
ante approach must also confront a second, perhaps even more important difficulty: time inconsistency. Rawls and Scanlon avoid time
inconsistency by using the construct of a hypothetical contract, not as
a criterion for governmental or individual choice, but as a higherorder criterion that is used at a single hypothetical moment in time to
identify the moral rules and principles that will be applied by individual and government actors over time. 109 By contrast, the ex ante approach is time inconsistent, as we shall now discuss at length.

rency" is a major theme in contemporary philosophical scholarship. See generally Arneson, supra note 5.
108See T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 21.-18 (1998); see also
Claire Finkelstein, A ContractarianApproach to Punishment, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 207, 214-15 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005) (arguing that contractarians would deny that basic social institutions are justifiable merely because they increase each individual's expected
well-being).
109On this feature of Rawls's and Scanlon's views, see Matthew
D. Adler, Against
"IndividualRisk": A Sympathetic Critique of Risk Assessment, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1121, 123237 (2005) (distinguishing between act and rule contractualism and discussing Rawls
and Scanlon). In effect, Rawls's and Scanlon's contractarian theories have a two-tiered
structure, similar to the two-tiered structure of rule utilitarianism. The hypothetical
contract picks out the correct set of moral rules; those rules then guide choices over
time. This approach avoids time inconsistency, at least potentially, because the rules
under consideration by the hypothetical contractors might be limited to timeconsistent rules.
Why not salvage the ex ante approach by giving it a similar two-tiered structure?
Throughout this Article, we have understood both the ex ante and ex post approaches
as choice criteria that will be applied, directly, to governmental policy choices over
time. But why not reframe the approaches as higher-order criteria for choosing moral
rules? The short answer is that a two-tiered structure is, at most, weakly welfarist; if the
chosen moral rule does not itself focus solely on well-being, then the theory is hardly
welfarist in the robust sense meant by Kaplow and Shavell and other proponents of
welfarism. Kaplow and Shavell and other contemporary welfarists believe, we take it,
that the morally relevant features of particular governmental choices include only welfare information. Within this normative tradition, the social welfare function is understood as a device that focuses solely on welfare impacts, and that is directly applicable
to governmental choices-not merely to some initial, and hypothetical, choice of
moral rules.
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3. Time Inconsistency of the Ex Ante Approach
Perhaps the most compelling affirmative argument for the surething principle, and against the ex ante approach, is that violating the
sure-thing principle makes the decision maker unsettlingly inconsistent over time.ll°
A time-inconsistent decision maker, facing a foreseeable and fully
specified contingency, prefers one course of action for that contingency when she views the contingency prospectively, and prefers another when and if the contingency actually arises. She plans, for instance, to take her umbrella to work if it rains the next morning, but
when it does rain, she dons her rain poncho instead. Furthermore, if
the time-inconsistent decision maker has taken certain actions up
front in anticipation of a contingency, she may try to undo those actions when the contingency arises. If she purchases an umbrella on
the way home from work the evening before, she may try to return it
on her way to work the next morning, having decided that her rain
poncho is the best option. Indeed, the time-inconsistent decision
maker may well realize upfront, at the time she formulates a contingent plan, that she will later resist that plan and try to undo it should
the contingency for which it is designed materialize. That is, even
while shopping for an umbrella the evening before, she may well realize that she will be returning it on her way to work the next morning.
In fact, realizing that her future contingent self will have different
ideas, the time-inconsistent decision maker may attempt to "tie herself
to the mast." She may destroy her rain poncho the evening before, or
she may set her alarm fifteen minutes later, so that she will have no
time to return the umbrella.
To be sure, the rational decision maker may "change plans" based
on new information. But if she anticipated that such information
might arise, then she is "changing plans" only in the sense that her
original plan called for changing actions in the event that she received
this new information. That is, her original plan was a contingent plan,
and that contingent plan has not changed. Furthermore, a rational
decision maker may not anticipate a contingency in the first place.
When that contingency arrives, she may revise her contingent plan by
adding yet one more contingency to the array of possible contingen-

110

On time inconsistency and the choice between ex post and ex ante social wel-

fare, see Hammond, Ex-Post Optimality, supra note 6, at 177-78 (advocating the ex post
approach over the ex ante approach on the basis of the finding that only the former is
time consistent for general social welfare functions).
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cies, and then deciding what to do therein. And, of course, a rational
decision maker may change her contingent plan if her preferences
over outcomes change between the time that she adopts her contigent
plan and the time that contingencies arise. The time-inconsistent decision maker, on the other hand, rejects a contingent plan upon occurrence of a fully anticipated contingency even when her preferences
over outcomes remain the same. A time-inconsistent decision maker
is, in a particular but very pointed sense, irrational.
It is easy to see that departures from the sure-thing principle-in
particular, the ex ante application of a social welfare function-can be
time inconsistent. We will first consider the issue in general terms
and then present two specific examples.
When we first encounter the ex ante social planner, before the actual social state is revealed, we may find her, as in many of our examples, unbothered by the fact that a policy produces ex post inequalities, because all individuals have equal prospects under the policy. In
making this judgment, she is violating the sure-thing principle because she is evaluating the outcome in each state not independently,
but with reference to outcomes in other states. When we meet her
again, however, after she has implemented the policy, and after the
state has been revealed, she may be singing a different tune. The
other state(s) that did not occur, and that were informing her choice
ex ante, are now irrelevant to her view regarding the current state of
affairs. States that did not occur are now, in effect, zero probability
states and, consequently, do not figure in her calculation of individuals' expected utilities. In this after-the-fact world, then, inequality in
the policy outcome is not mitigated by the possibility that the reverse
inequality might also obtain. The possibility of the reverse inequality
has passed.
In essence, the sure-thing principle requires that the contribution
of each possible outcome to social welfare be separately evaluatedthat it not turn on the nature of other possible outcomes. The resolution of uncertainty over time operates to separate the outcomes that
actually occur from what else was possible. If the planner was not
originally treating the outcomes separately, she will be eventually, and
this may cause odd shifts in her attitudes and behaviors.
For a simple example, imagine that the social planner at time T
faces a status quo that, like policy Q in the Diamond example," involves two possible and equally probable states, leading to outcomes
I See supra Part V.B.1 tbl.7.
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with unequal utilities, but producing equal expected utilities across
individuals. At time T, one of the states will be revealed to be the actual state. Redistribution of welfare within a given state is possible, at
some cost. The ex ante social planner at T may choose to take a costless "hand-tying" measure that will prevent her from redistributing
utility at T,. If her hands are not tied at To, then at T, whichever state
is revealed, she will want to redistribute (assuming that the costs of redistributing are sufficiently low). Forecasting her own unfettered behavior at T, however, the ex ante social planner will undertake the
hand-tying measure at T. From her perspective at T, the future redistribution "solves" a nonexistent equity problem at positive cost; the
positive equity effects of such compensation wash out across states
from her perspective, leaving cost without benefit. But having thus
tied her hands at T, the planner will regret having done so when she
reaches T1 and the state is revealed.
A modification and extension of Broome's example of repeated
randomization" 2 provides an even more striking example of the irrationality of the ex ante approach. Suppose there are two individuals
and an indefinite number of periods. In the first period, the social
planner flips a coin. After seeing the outcome of the toss, the planner
may choose to stop or to flip again. If the planner chooses to stop,
and the coin lands on heads, then the first individual gets 100 utils
and the second gets nothing. If the coin lands on tails, then the second individual gets 100 utils and the first gets nothing. If the planner
chooses to flip again, she "pays" 1 util for the right to do so, thus leaving 99 utils left to allocate. She then flips the coin again. Seeing the
outcome, she decides whether to stop or flip again. If she decides to
stop, and the coin lands heads, the first individual gets all 99 remaining utils. If it lands tails, the second individual gets the 99. If the
planner decides to flip again, then the total is reduced to 98, and so
on.
When will the ex ante planner stop flipping? The answer depends
in part on her degree of equity regard relative to the cost of flipping
again. Under very plausible assumptions, she will continue to flip until almost nothing of the 100 utils is left. Consider, for example, the
basic social welfare function, (u, + u, ) - Iu,
j -u I, which is Paretian and
equity regarding. As shown in detail in the Appendix, an ex ante
planner employing this social welfare function will continue to toss
the coin period after period until only 2 utils remain to be allocated.

112

See supra text accompanying note 105.
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Until this point, the social welfare loss from reducing total utility by 1
util (and so reducing social welfare by 1 unit) is less than the social
welfare gain from equalizing prospects (which gain equals half of the
total that could currently be allocated).
C. Violating Ex Ante Pareto Superiority
And what of the fact that the ex post approach conflicts with ex
ante Pareto superiority? As we demonstrated above in Part IV, every
equity-regarding social welfare function, if applied ex post, diverges
from ex ante Pareto superiority in some choice situations. This means
that, in some choice situations, the ex post planner will stand alone
against the unanimous wishes of her constituency. Isn't that a decisive
objection to the ex post approach?
We think not. Imagine that our normative theory tells us that social choice should be welfarist and sensitive to equity considerations.
Imagine, too, that we are further inclined to think that welfarist social
choice, like individual choice, should respect the sure-thing principle-that it should be consequentialist rather than "contractarian." At
this point, we learn that equity-regarding social choice that respects
the sure-thing principle will conflict with ex ante Pareto superiority.
The social planner, who cares about the distribution of well-being in
each possible outcome, might pick a policy different from that which
each individual, maximizing her expected well-being, would select.
But this occurs because the individuals are each focused on their own
well-being. None of them cares about the distribution of well-being in
different possible outcomes (indeed, none of them cares about equity
at all), while the social planner does. Because this is how the conflict
between the ex post approach and ex ante Pareto superiority arisesas a conflict between the aggregate of individual self-interested perspectives and a social perspective that is impartial and equity regarding-why would that conflict persuade us to abandon the ex post approach?
It might be objected that "fair process" concerns cut in favor of ex
ante Pareto superiority. Doesn't a commitment to democratic processes require the social planner to choose ex ante Pareto superior
13
policies? But this is to make the same mistake that Diamond does. 1
To plump for "fair democratic process" as a determinant of social

13

See supra text accompanying notes 105-106 (criticizing Diamond's argument

that "fair process" considerations argue for an ex ante approach).
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choice is to move beyond welfarism. The outcome of a unanimous
democratic process may not be ex ante Pareto superior (because the
individuals involved may be motivated by considerations other than
their own well-being), and a policy can be ex ante Pareto superior, by
virtue of maximizing each individual's expected utility, without any
actual voting or other democratic choice at all.
It might also be objected that ex ante Pareto inferior options will
be "unstable." If the social planner chooses the ex ante Pareto inferior option, the affected individuals will overturn it, or at least will
make efforts to do so, with social costs. But no actual choice can ever
be "overturned"; at most, the affected individuals can force the planner to make a later choice that is similar in some respects to the earlier, Pareto superior one. Moreover, many Pareto inferior choices will
not be "overturned" even in this weaker sense, given collective action
problems among the individuals. Thus, it is a contingent question
how costly or unstable ex ante Pareto inferior choices will be. Those
costs will show up in the possible outcomes of the Pareto inferior
choice. They may or may not be large enough to sway the ex post
planner toward a different option. In any event, ex post social planning will be sensitive to these "instability" costs; their possibility does
not amount to an argument against that approach.
A final objection to the ex post approach in terms of its disregard
for ex ante Pareto superiority concerns the hypothetical example of a
"Robinson Crusoe" economy, consisting of a single individual. In this
special case, ex ante Pareto superiority collapses to the maximization
of the individual's expected well-being. One policy is ex ante Pareto
superior to another if and only if Robinson Crusoe's expected utility
under the first policy is greater than the second. Ex post application
of some equity-regarding social welfare functions, in the Robinson
Crusoe case, may reject the policy that maximizes Robinson's expected well-being.
How could this occur? If the welfare function is, for example,
strictly concave-so that individual utility has diminishing social welfare returns-then the social planner will, in effect, be more risk
averse than the individual. Because utility has a diminishing positive
impact on social welfare, the planner will be less impressed than the
individual with the potential utility upside of any risk. The planner
may, therefore, disagree with the individual regarding which policy
risks are worth taking.
Isn't this perverse? One arguable response is that social welfare
functions are inapplicable in a Robinson Crusoe economy. Social wel-
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fare functions represent different moral views and therefore, arguably,
should come into play only when there are multiple individuals. This
answer may or may not be persuasive in the Robinson Crusoe case.
Even if it is persuasive in that hypothetical setting, it does not answer a
related case-one in which the policies have identical welfare impacts
on all individuals, meaning that, for a given policy, each individual's
utility in any state is the same as every other individual's utility in that
state. The ex post application of an equity-regarding social welfare
function, even in the case of identical individuals, may reject a policy
that is ex ante Pareto superior.
What are we to make of this objection to the ex post approach?
To begin, some readers may find the choice of an ex ante Pareto inferior policy less counterintuitive in the many-person, identicalindividual case than in the Robinson Crusoe case. Consider the prioritarian view that individual welfare has diminishing marginal moral
weight. If one is wedded to that view, the government's imposition of
the Pareto inferior result in the many-person case might well seem
like an instance of morally justified paternalism. Morality requires
more risk aversion than the individuals display.
But for those who are troubled by these cases-and that reaction
is plausible-we stress that the cases are not an objection to all equityregarding social welfare functions. They involve a particular kind of
equity-regarding social welfare function: one that is strictly concave
everywhere-that is, as between any two utility vectors.1 4 Such a social welfare function (no matter how small or large the population)
imbues the social planner not only with equity regard, but also with an
extra degree of risk aversion--one that operates over and above the
potential risk aversion of individuals and that exists independent of
the planner's preference for equity. Not all equity-regarding social
welfare criteria are everywhere strictly concave. For instance, rankweighted social welfare functions-which, as discussed above in Part
II.B, take a variably weighted sum of individual utilities with larger
weights for individuals who are less well off-are not everywhere
strictly concave, and yet are equity regarding. These social welfare
functions add no extra societal risk aversion to social choice-at least
not apart from their preference for equity. In the special case of a
single individual, or of multiple individuals who have the same utility

114

It is thus an objection to prioritarian equity-regarding social welfare functions,

but it extends as well to social welfare functions that are strictly concave but not additively separable in individual utilities.
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as each other in any given state, they evidently collapse to simple utilitarianism. So even applied ex post, they never disagree with the individual(s) in these cases.
There are many equity-regarding social welfare functions. Some
iron-rice-bowl functions might seem to give extreme weight to equity.
Some let-them-eat-cake functions might seem to give extreme weight
to efficiency. Some, in addition to displaying equity regard, display a
societal level of risk aversion, which may also independently cause
such functions to violate ex ante Pareto superiority. We do not here
argue for the acceptability of the entire set of equity-regarding social
welfare functions. At most, we argue only that the social criterion
should be located somewhere in that set. And, in fact, the main thrust
of our argument is conditional: if an equity-regarding social welfare
function is adopted, it should be applied ex post rather than ex ante.
To summarize: welfarism is best specified as accepting the surething principle at the level of social as well as individual choice, and
thus as accepting the ex post approach to social choice under uncertainty-notwithstanding the conflict with ex ante Pareto superiority.
This conclusion, like virtually any normative position, is contestable,
but we find it very plausible and hope the reader does as well. Even if
she does not, it is critical to understand the logical connections between the sure-thing principle, welfarism, nonwelfarism, individual
choice, social choice, equity regard, ex post Paretianism, and ex ante
Paretianism. We hope that this Part, along with the preceding ones,
has helped illuminate those connections.
VI. LEGAL APPLICATIONS

This Article has sought to contribute to an important current debate in legal theory: that regarding the justifiability and meaning of
"welfarist" approaches to law. We have argued for the following, very
general position: if social choice should be welfarist and equity regarding, then (ideally) decision makers should handle uncertainty by
applying the social welfare function in an ex post rather than ex ante
manner. Put another way, policymakers should focus on the prospects for equity, not on the equity of prospects.
We do not attempt to provide concrete policy recommendations.
To do so would mean specifying a particular social welfare function.
Some would argue that this is a quintessentially legislative task.
Whether or not that is true, the problem of specifying the form of an
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equity-regarding social welfare function certainly requires much
analysis and debate, which a substantial number of scholars in philosophy and economics have undertaken, but which we lack space to
pursue here.
Still, the reader might wonder whether the theoretical work undertaken in this Article-the argument for an ex post rather than ex
ante approach to welfarist social choice-has relevance to law and policy. This Part aims to allay that concern. Ex ante/ex post divergence
can arise in a host of areas. Across a multitude of legal and policy
domains, ex post planners may end up choosing courses of action that
their ex ante counterparts would reject-which, indeed, may be ex
ante Pareto inferior. This Part provides a sampling of illustrative examples drawn
from some of the most salient legal and policy issues of
5
our time.1

A. Risk-Reduction Policiesfor Widely Borne Risks
(Herein of Terrorists,Asian Birds, and British Cows)
One important difference between the ex post and ex ante approaches to welfarism is this: the ex post policymaker is willing to go
farther than her ex ante counterpart in alleviating hazards that expose
many to risk, but few to actual injury. Both policymakers may find intervention worthwhile for the usual reasons-externalities, market
failures, paternalism, etc. But in the narrow incidence of actual harm,
115

One worry that may persist is that our specifications of the ex ante and ex post

approaches to welfarist social choice under uncertainty-throughout the Article, including this Part-assume a highly idealized decision maker. Like many other scholars
in contemporary decision theory, social choice theory, and game theory, we have developed a normative theory which is suitable for an "unboundedly rational" choosersomeone who is not omniscient, but who has the cognitive and computational resources to handle uncertainty by considering each choice as a lottery across numerous,
highly specified states of the world to which she can attach probabilities. But what
about bounded rationality? We do not have a satisfying answer to this question, because no one has yet developed a satisfying account of rational choice for uncertain
and boundedly rational decision makers. In particular, the intellectual tools that
would take us from an account of social choice for unboundedly rational social planners to a decision procedure for boundedly rational planners-administrators, legislators, judges-have yet to be developed. All we can say here is that basic differences in
ideal theory among welfarists--different specifications of the social welfare function,
or the difference between ex ante and ex post approaches to choice under uncertainty-would surely be reflected in nonideal theory, in recommendations for boundedly rational planners. But this is just a promissory note. Our analysis provides a general template for how unboundedly rational governmental decision makers should
handle uncertainty, assuming welfarism. It does not provide a general template for
how real-world officials, given their cognitive limitations, should do so.
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the ex post policymaker sees an additional equity problem deserving
of additional attention, which her ex ante counterpart, focused as she
is on the relative equality of prospects, does not recognize. This will
induce the ex post planner to push harder for costly prevention
measures that avoid or negate such solely ex post inequality.
The September 11 attacks on New York and the Pentagon, the
London subway bombings, the Madrid commuter train bombings, and
other terrorist attacks around the globe bring to the fore the question
of how much a society should spend on the security of its citizens. If
the society cares about equity, the answer depends on whether it takes
an ex ante or an ex post view. In particular, an ex post social planner
is willing to spend more on security than the ex ante planner, because
the ex post planner sees an additional equity problem with a terrorist
attack that the ex ante planner does not.
To understand why, imagine a city whose citizens start out identical in every respect, and imagine that every citizen has an equal
chance of being injured. The ex ante city planner spends on security
until the value of additionally reducing the sum of individuals' expected loss from the attack (a function of the harm from the attack
and the probability of an attack) is not worth the additional spending
required to do so. The ex post planner spends more than this because the unequal ex post impact of the attack adds insult to injury, as
it were, and alleviating this inequality by preventing an attack in the
first place is an additional reason to spend on prevention. 11
The same analysis applies to public spending on vaccinations or
food inspections. If policymakers care about equity, the proper
amount to spend will depend again on whether they take an ex ante
or ex post approach. As with the terrorist attack, the ex ante planner
is not troubled by the fact that not everyone shares in the social cost of
the virus or the tainted meat. The ex ante planner cares only about
ex ante equity, and the fact that a virus or tainted meat may affect everyone with roughly equal likelihood (supposing this to be the case)
means that equity plays almost no role in her spending calculations.
The ex post planner, however, sees an additional equity problem in
the narrow incidence of disease and is thereby willing to spend more
on vaccinating and inspecting because, in addition to reducing suffering from the disease, these measures reduce the inequity caused by
the disease's random incidence.

116

See Appendix Section K for a more formal discussion of this point.
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Daniel Markovits's scholarship on the distributive implications of
quarantines and vaccinations makes a related point about risk prevention: just as the amount of spending for risk prevention may depend
on the choice between ex ante and ex post approaches, so too may the
particular kind of risk prevention program selected. "7 Consider the
policymaker deciding whether to prevent a future epidemic through
mass vaccination (which will impose time and discomfort costs on everyone, but avoids almost all cases of the disease) and quarantine
(which avoids vaccination costs, but results in those infected incurring
large costs down the road, including both the direct cost of the illness
and the cost of being quarantined). If the quarantine option increases expected overall welfare, then-if everyone is equally exposed
to the disease-that option is presumably ex ante Pareto superior and
will be selected by the policymaker over the vaccination option. But
the ex post policymaker may insist on vaccinations instead, given the
inequality in each state between those particular individuals who end
up being infected and quarantined, and the rest of the population.
B. Risk Compensation (Herein of Workers' Compensation,
Unemployment Insurance, and the Compensated Siting of "LULUs")
Prevention or mitigation is not the only governmental policy option for responding to risks to health, safety, property, or other aspects of well-being. Compensation is another option-either afterthe-fact compensation for those who end up suffering harms, or before-the-fact compensation for all who are exposed to the harm. In
both instances, the ex ante and ex post approaches may select different policies as optimal.
Consider, first, after-the-fact compensation. Many of these programs exist even when the ex ante prospects of harm are roughly
equal. This creates a puzzle for the ex ante approach, but no puzzle
at all for the ex post approach. Workers' compensation is a good example. Any one of the workers on the factory floor may be injured on
the job. And each may face the same prospect of injury. Why, then,
incur the administrative costs of a workers' compensation program,
which both reduces overall well-being and (from the ex ante perspective) has no equity benefit?

117 See generally Markovits, supra note 6 (discussing the distributive implications of
quarantines and vaccinations from ex ante and ex post perspectives).
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One answer is that workers' compensation substitutes for failures
in the insurance market-for example, the failure of actual workers to
purchase the insurance that rationally they should, given their risk
aversion. But, at best, this argument explains workers' compensation
schemes that seek to mimic hypothetical insurance markets. By contrast, ex post planners might support schemes that provide compensation for injured workers above and beyond what they would have insured for. This is because the ex post planner sees workers' injuries
as, inter alia, an equity problem within the population of workers,
while the ex ante planner does not. From the ex ante planner's viewpoint, there is no equity issue to the extent that each worker is equally
likely to be injured. From the ex post planner's perspective, however,
an equity problem is certain to arise, as the costs of inevitable injury
are actually borne not by all workers evenly, but instead by an unlucky
few.
A similar analysis applies to health insurance, to unemployment
insurance, and to any government program that compensates harms
to which many are potentially exposed but few are actually exposed.
Unforeseeable changes in the economy may cause layoffs in certain
sectors, for example. The risk of sectoral layoffs of this sort is widespread, but the actual cost is more narrowly focused. Both the ex ante
planner and the ex post planner may wish to put in place a system of
unemployment insurance. But the ex post planner is likely to fund
the program to a greater degree. On the plus side, the ex post planner, like the ex ante planner, may be concerned about the cost of unemployment risk and the lack of affordable private insurance against
job loss. On the negative side, the ex post planner, like the ex ante
planner, may be concerned about the administrative costs and potential perverse incentive effects of unemployment insurance. But unlike
the ex ante planner, the ex post planner places an additional item on
the plus side of the ledger: compensating unemployed workers, although costly, solves an ex post equity problem that the ex ante planner does not see.
Consider, now, policies that provide before-the-fact compensation
for being exposed to the risk of harm, property damage, or other welfare setbacks. A good example is "compensated siting" schemes."
One commonly proposed mechanism for overcoming local resistance

118

See Vicki Been, Compensated Siting Proposals: Is It Time To Pay Attention?, 21

FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 787, 788-96 (1994) (surveying proposals for the compensated siting
of LULUs, including proposals that involve ex ante compensation).
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to toxic waste dumps and other "LULUs" (locally unattractive land
uses) is to couple the siting of the LULU with payments to all of the
residents, sufficient to induce them to accept it. The idea here is that
the LULU plus payments to locals from remote individuals (those who
benefit in lower product costs and so forth from the LULU, but do
not bear its costs) will be ex ante Pareto superior for the entire population. That argument for compensated siting is, necessarily, compelling for the ex ante theorist. But it is not compelling for the ex post
theorist. Some of those exposed to the LULU will die, or suffer injury
or substantial economic or hedonic damage, perhaps leading to an
increase in ex post inequality. This is not to say that the ex post theorist will necessarily favor the no-LULU option over the option of siting
the LULU with compensation. (After all, the costs to society of having
no waste dumps at all would be overwhelming.) Rather, the point is
that the ex post theorist will need to further analyze an ex ante Pareto
superior compensated siting scheme, bringing to bear her particular
social welfare function. For her, in contrast with the ex ante theorist,
the fact that the scheme is ex ante Pareto superior, relative to other
policies, does not guarantee its optimality.
C. "PopulationRisk" Versus "IndividualRisk" and the Problem of
Statistical Versus Identified Lives
Scholarship on environmental, health, and safety regulation regularly takes the position that "population risk" (total fatalities) and "individual risk" (the risk of fatality borne by various individuals in the
population) are both relevant in regulating hazards. " 9 A paradigmatic example would be a choice between expending a limited regulatory budget on eliminating toxic chemicals that are present in high
concentrations in a waste dump in a small town with a population of
1000, and that create an incremental fatality risk for each resident of
1 in 1000; or expending the funds instead on cleaning up much lower
concentrations of a toxin that are present in an urban waste dump
and that expose each individual in a population of 100,000 to an incremental fatality risk of 2 in 100,000. In this sort of case, it is standardly suggested, "population risk" considerations weigh in favor of
cleaning up the urban dump, while "individual risk" considerations

119

See Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death and Harm: The Normative Foundations of Risk

Regulation, 87 MINN. L. REv. 1293, 1413, 1427-28 (2003) (citing this body of scholarship).
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weigh in favor of cleaning up the town dump. 120 Note that the urban
dump can be expected to cause two deaths, while the town dump can
be expected to cause only one death. On the other hand, because the
toxins in the town dump are present at much higher concentrations,
it imposes a large incremental "individual risk" of fatality on each exposed individual (1 in 1000); while the urban dump imposes much
lower levels of "individual risk" (1 in 50,000 on each urban dweller).
Scholarship on the valuation of life, reflecting a widely held lay
view, also sometimes takes the position that remedying the deaths of
"identified" individuals has greater social value than remedying "statistical" deaths. 21 This view is a special case of the position that focuses
on both "individual risk" and "population risk." It says, in effect, that
hazards which pose an "individual risk" of 1 to some individuals take
special regulatory priority. (To say that someone is the "identified"
rather than "statistical" prospective victim of a hazard is just to say that
her risk is unity, or at least is very high.) As between a hazard that
poses an "individual risk" of 1 to N persons and causes N expected
deaths, and a hazard that poses low "individual risk" and causes N expected deaths, regulators should choose to avert the first hazard.
A concern for "individual risk" is reflected not just in scholarship,
but also in actual regulatory practice. Many environmental, health,
and safety schemes incorporate "individual risk" cutoffs, seeking to
ensure that the incremental "individual risk" to the maximally exposed individual, or to some other specified individual in the exposure distribution, not exceed some numerical threshold (typically, 1 in
1,000,000; 1 in 100,000; 1 in 10,000; or 1 in 1000). 112 One illustrative
example (there are many): the FDA regulates food additives so that
the risk to a "highly exposed" individual, one in the ninetieth percentile of food consumption, does not exceed 1 in 1,000,000.123

120 See, e.g., Adam M. Finkel, ComparingRisks Thoughtfully, 7 RISK 325, 343
(1996).
121 See Richard Brook, Statistical and Identifiable
Deaths, in PHILOSOPHY AND ITS PUB-

LIC ROLE 167, 168 (William Aitken & John Haldane eds., 2004) (noting that "[m]any
individuals feel that the value of an identifiable life should be greater than a statistical
life" (quotation marks omitted)); cf Charles Fried, The Value of Life, 82 HARv. L. REv.
1415 (1969) (critically surveying arguments for distinguishing between statistical and
identified deaths).
122 SeeAdler, supra note 109, at 1147-79 (surveying the role of "individual
risk" considerations in regulatory practice).
123 See id. at 1165-67.
More precisely, this is the FDA's approach for carcinogens
exempt from the Delaney Clause. The FDA also focuses on "individual risk" to the
ninetieth percentile consumer in regulating noncarcinogenic additives. See id. at 1165.
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We can view the regulatory practice of considering "individual
risk" along with "population risk" as an attempt to remedy a lack of
equity regard in the "population risk" criterion taken alone. There
are many ways to produce a given "population risk." A "population
risk" of 1 death in a group of 1000 might be created "equitably," as
when each individual faces a risk of 1 in 1000, or "inequitably," as
when a particular person in the group is certain to die. Adding "individual risk" criteria to the analysis-whether through a prohibition on
identified victims or, more generally, through a threshold that specifies the acceptable "individual risk" of death-is a way to favor a seemingly more equitable distribution of harms.
But "individual risk" tests are problematic on a number of counts.
For welfarists, they are problematic because they are insensitive to the
nonfatal impacts of hazards. A hazard may increase some person's
risk of death but also increase her expected utility, all things considered, if the hazard has countervailing benefits. "Individual risk" tests,
at least as employed in regulatory practice, are also problematic because they focus on the individual's risk of death from a particular
source, not from all sources.1 1 4 A given individual at high risk from
some source might have a high life expectancy, all risks considered.
Our analysis reveals yet another difficulty with "individual risk"
tests: their ex ante focus. To see this, imagine a very simple scenario
in which premature death always yields utility 0, and a full life span,
utility 1. In each state, the utility vector is a string of zeros and ones;
each individual either lives a full life span or dies prematurely. The
"individual risk" that a given policy imposes on a given individual-in
this scenario-is simply 1 minus her expected utility. It is her chance
of dying prematurely, given all the risks to which she is exposed, if the
policy is implemented.
We are dealing, here, with a refined version of the "individual
risk" approach that cannot be criticized for ignoring some sources of
welfare, or some risks. Still, the approach is problematic. Imagine
any methodology for social decision making that is a function notjust
of the number of people who die in each state (i.e., the welfare value of
the utility vector in each state) but also the probability that each individual will die (i.e., each individual's "individual risk"). Such meth124

See W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC,

AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 7, 26 (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds.,
2001) (noting that policy focus with respect to risk equity is on incremental risk, while
"[a]ny meaningful notion of risk equity... should be grounded in the absolute risk
level of the individual").
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odologies include: (1) the approach, reflected in current regulatory
policy, which seeks to reduce "individual risk" below a threshold, such
as 1 in 1,000,000; and (2) the limiting case of this approach, which
seeks to avoid policies with identified victims. Given the analysis earlier in the Article,125 it is relatively straightforward to show that, given
symmetry, any such methodology will violate the sure-thing principle.
An easy way to see the inconsistency of these "individual risk" tests
with the sure-thing principle is to consider policies that are permutations of each other-that amend some status quo by changing the
identity of the individuals who die in a given state, but not their numbers. Consider a status quo in which every individual is below a proposed "individual risk" threshold. By an appropriate reordering of
the vectors in some states, we can raise some individuals above the
threshold. By reordering the vectors so that one individual dies in
every state, we trigger the concern with "identified" victims. But, as a
matter of ex post equity, the policies are all identical. In each state,
some individuals are well off (they live a full life) and others are badly
off (they die prematurely). Merely shifting who dies in a given state
does nothing to redress the inequity in that state; and a combination
of such shifts, whatever effect it might have on various persons' "individual risk" levels, does nothing to change the expected degree of inI
equity. 12
D. Pain-and-SufferingDamages
The ex post approach provides a new perspective on the topic of
damages for pain and suffering,
a controversial topic that has gener/
127
ated much legal scholarship.
At least in the case of products liabil-

125
126

See supra Part V.A.

The argument that "individual risk" violates the sure-thing principle general-

izes beyond our simple example with ones and zeros. Even in more complicated settings, "individual risk," suitably defined, can always be changed with the kind of permutations described in the text. Such permutations will, therefore, change social
preferences when "individual risks" are separately accounted for. However, given symmetry, such permutations merely replace the outcome in one state with another socially equivalent outcome. Under the sure-thing principle, this should not affect social
choice.
127 See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs
of Accidents: Painand-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1793, 1797-1834 (1995)
(summarizing "the conventional wisdom" that tort compensation for pain and suffering is undesirable on insurance grounds, and arguing that individuals might rationally
purchase pain-and-suffering insurance). Our analysis is different from Croley and
Hanson's, because we argue that the equity-regarding social planner might favor pain-
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ity, pain-and-suffering damages amount to a kind of compulsory insurance. All consumers pay a higher price for products if pain-andsuffering damages are part of liability, and those who are injured receive a payout. But we do not observe pain-and-suffering insurance in
the free market-perhaps because of market failures, but perhaps, instead, because rational individuals might well refrain from purchasing
pain-and-suffering insurance. Why? As discussed in Part III.C above,
if the occurrence of pain and suffering lowers the marginal utility of
money, then it is irrational to insure against it. Why, then, should tort
law impose compulsory insurance on the consumers of potentially
hazardous products? One possible answer is that pain and suffering
generally increase the marginal utility of money, and there are insurance market failures. Another is that pain-and-suffering damages have
a deterrence function in addition to their insurance function.
The ex post approach provides a third answer, one not available
to the ex ante theorist. Even if pain-and-suffering insurance has no
deterrence benefits (or benefits too small to outweigh administrative
costs), and even if a population of consumers would not rationally
purchase such insurance, requiring this population to purchase insurance can nevertheless increase ex post social welfare. Compulsory
pain-and-suffering insurance shifts money from an injury-free state, in
which the consumer is at a higher welfare level, to an injured state, in
which the consumer is at a lower welfare level. Imagine that money
has lower marginal utility in the injured state. In that case, shifting
money to the injured state lowers the consumer's expected well-being,
but may still have a sufficient benefit in terms of ex post equity to justify the shift.
E. CriminalLaw
Harel, Safra, and Segal provide two formal examples of how ex
post egalitarianism can justify non-utilitarian policies in the area of
criminal law. 128 They assume, in the first example, that society is
choosing a policy consisting of both a burden of proof for criminal
conviction and a probability that crimes will be detected. 129 Raising
the probability of detection requires increased enforcement effort and
is therefore costly. A given policy affects the number of individuals

and-suffering damages even in cases where the injury lowers the marginal utility of
money and rational individuals therefore would not purchase insurance.
128 See Harel, Safra & Segal,
supra note 6, at 63-69.
129

See id. at 64-66.
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and their utility levels in five different groups: convicted innocents,
convicted criminals, innocent victims of crime, ordinary innocents,
and unconvicted criminals. The authors show that (under certain assumptions) the ex post egalitarian will favor increasing the burden of
proof for conviction, together with a compensating increase in the
probability of detection (financed by taxes on innocents and nonconvicted criminals), as compared with the utilitarian policy. This shift
decreases the number of individuals in the worst-off group-convicted
innocents-and decreases the spread between their welfare and that
of the best-off groups (ordinary innocents and unconvicted criminals).
In a second formal example, the authors consider the severity of
the criminal sanction. 130 Gary Becker famously argued that the optimal sanction policy, given the costs of detection, is to threaten very
high sanctions-torture or death for a parking violation!-and to use
very few resources on detection. 1 ' In their analysis, Harel, Safra, and
Segal consider policies consisting of a level of sanction severity and a
probability of detection. The ex post egalitarian will choose to shift
away from the optimal utilitarian policy by increasing the probability
of detection and reducing the severity of the sanction. This shift reduces overall well-being-reflected again in increased taxes for crime
detection-but increases the well-being of those in the worst-off
group, namely those who are punished.
Harel, Safra, and Segal, in their formal analyses, compare ex post
egalitarianism with utilitarianism-not with ex ante egalitarianism.
The analyses are nonetheless quite helpful for our purposes here, in
suggesting how the ex ante and ex post approaches to equity regard
can deviate. What drives their results, of course, is the fact that a utilitarian policy leads to a substantial spread in actual well-being. That
spread may not be mirrored in ex ante utilities, depending on when
the policy is chosen. At the extreme (if society commits from day one
to a policy), individuals may all face the same probabilities of falling
into each category-convicted criminals, unconvicted criminals, innocents, victims, and convicted innocents-and thus the utilitarian and
ex ante egalitarian policies will converge. Or, to examine a less extreme case, individuals may know whether they are innocents or criminals, but not know whether they will end up at the high or low end of

130
131

See id. at 66-68.
See id. at 58-59 (reviewing Becker's argument).
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each group: as convicted or victimized innocents versus ordinary innocents, or convicted versus ordinary criminals.
F. Capital Gains and Lotteries
A certain amount of stock market gains may be due to luck. If we
are to believe random-walk theorists, most are. Ex post and ex ante
equity analysts view these windfall gains differently. The ex ante analyst sees no equity problem with the kind of windfall gain that any individual might have enjoyed, had she been lucky enough to have her
particular investment take off. The fact that one person invested in
Microsoft and enjoyed a gain, while another invested in Sunbeam and
did not, is of no consequence to ex ante equity analysis because, beforehand, each had an equal chance of profit or loss. The ex post
analyst, on the other hand, is troubled by the fact that one person
makes out well and another does not. (To the extent that this gain is
derived from skill in investing, this concern is, of course, balanced
against the social benefits of rewarding good decisions.)
Why does this difference in attitude matter? One arena where
such differences concretely manifest themselves is the taxation of
capital gains. Both ex ante and ex post planners may have reasons to
tax or avoid taxing capital gains. The ex post planner, however, places
an additional weight on the taxation side of the balance. She is concerned with the inequity produced by the actual pattern of capital
gains and losses, whereas her ex ante counterpart is not.
Similarly, the ex post equity analyst may be more hesitant to endorse public lotteries. Both planners may see pluses and minuses to
raising state revenues in this manner. But the ex post planner sees an
additional minus where the ex ante planner does not. The fact that
all lottery participants have an equal chance of winning assuages the
equity concerns of the ex ante-but not the ex post-policy analyst.
G. Tax Policy Norms
In an influential article, Thomas Griffith argues against the traditional approach to tax policy analysis:
Traditional tax policy analysis has focused on whether the particular tax
provision under examination is consistent with basic 'tax norms' such as
horizontal equity, vertical equity, ability to pay and the ideal tax base,
typically Haig-Simons income. These norms are not grounded, however,
in more general ethical principles. This Article will argue that this is a
fundamental flaw and, thus, special tax principles should be discarded as
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a method of evaluating tax policy. Instead, this Article recommends that
the likely consequences of the policies under consideration should be
determined and then judged under explicitly stated general normative
principles. This approach can lead to tax policy recommendations
quite
132
different from those generated by traditional methods.
Griffith illustrates his proposed analytic approach by focusing on

the taxation of personal injury recoveries.
that he uses is ex ante Pareto superiority:

The normative criterion

A tax policy is ex ante Pareto superior if, prior to the time any taxpayer
knows his particular circumstances, each taxpayer would prefer that policy. In the context of personal injury recoveries, the ex ante perspective
means that each individual must choose the tax treatment of such recov13
eries without knowing whether or not he will be injured.

Griffith argues that-in contrast to current practice 14 -only recoveries for medical expenses, not for lost wages or pain and suffering,
should be exempt from income tax, since only in the first case does an
exemption shift income1 3between states in a way that increases the tax5
payer's expected utility.
We fully agree with Griffith that-bracketing bounded rationality-tax policy makers should bring to bear fundamental moral prin-

ciples rather than traditional tax policy norms that are only imperfectly associated with any plausible moral theory. Within welfarism,
this means that-again, bracketing bounded rationality-tax policy
makers should bring to bear some social welfare function. But we obviously disagree with Griffith's assumption that debates about the
form of the social welfare function-or more generally, about the
choice between welfarist and nonwelfarist views-can be circumvented
by taking ex ante Pareto superiority as a normative principle that all
plausible moral theories support. The Pareto principle for outcomes
may have that status; ex ante Pareto superiority does not, as we have

132Thomas D. Griffith, Should "Tax Norms" Be Abandoned? Rethinking
Tax Policy

Analysis and the Taxation of Personal Injury Recoveries, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1115, 1116.

Thanks to Yoram Margalioth for suggesting that we engage Griffith's article.
153

Id. at 1121-22 (italics omitted).

Subsequent to publication of Griffith's article, Congress amended the relevant
code section, I.R.C. § 104(a), to allow an exclusion only for damages awarded on account of personal physical injury. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-188, § 1605(b), 110 Stat. 1735, 1838 (1996). However, in Murphy v. LIRS., 460
F.3d 79, 81 (2006), the D.C. Circuit ruled that section 104(a) as amended is unconstitutional for failing to exclude damages awarded on account of nonphysical injury, such
damages not being "income" within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment.
135 Id. at 1118-19, 1131-34.
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argued at length. Tax analysts sympathetic to welfarism and equity regard should follow Griffith's advice to abandon traditional norms
such as "horizontal equity," "vertical equity," or "ability to pay," but
not his further premise that egalitarians should embrace tax policies
that make everyone better off ex ante. 136
CONCLUSION

This Article has trained its attention on a vital problem within welfarism, one insufficiently appreciated by legal scholars: the problem
of welfarist policy choice under uncertainty. We have explicated two
different possible approaches: the ex ante approach, which applies
the social welfare function to the vector of expected utilities associated
with each policy under consideration; and the ex post approach,
which calculates the expected value of the social welfare function for
each policy (by applying the function to each possible outcome, discounting by the outcome's probability, and summing).
The Article has explained how these two approaches can diverge
for any "equity-regarding" social welfare function. The family of equity-regarding social welfare functions are those that satisfy the PigouDalton principle-in contrast to a utilitarian function-and include
both prioritarian and comparativist social welfare functions. We have
shown that, for any equity-regarding social welfare function, there are
policy choice situations in which the function applied ex post prefers
one policy but applied ex ante prefers another. Yet more strikingly,
we have shown that, for any equity-regarding social welfare function,
there will be choice situations in which the function applied ex post
prefers a policy which is ex ante Pareto inferior to another option.137
Further, the Article has clarified the conditions under which ex
ante and ex post approaches diverge, for prioritarian and comparativist functions. We have demonstrated that governmental compensation mechanisms cure the divergence only if the mechanisms are implausibly powerful-only if utility is freely transferable between
persons and states. And we have shown that private insurance exacerbates, rather than cures, the ex ante/ex post divergence.
So which approach to welfarist policy choice under uncertainty is
more attractive as a normative matter? We have argued that the ex
post approach is the better specification of welfarism. "Fairness" ar-

136
137

See id. at 1121.
This assumes continuity, as referred to supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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guments for the ex ante approach are misconceived on this score,
both because they depart from welfarism, and because concerns for
fair process only coincide haphazardly with the ex ante application of
a social welfare function. Within welfarism, there are two powerful
considerations favoring the ex post approach: the "sure-thing principle," which many find a compelling axiom of rationality, and the principle of "time consistency.", On the other hand, the potential conflict
with ex ante Pareto superiority does raise important worries about the
ex post approach, but we have argued that these worries can be defused. It bears emphasis that all of the equity-regarding social welfare
functions we have explored are Paretian in their ranking of outcomes,
and that the ex post approach therefore will favor policy P over policy
Q if P's outcome, in each possible state, is Pareto superior to Q's outcome in that state.
Finally, the Article has sought to show that the ex post approach
to welfarist policy choice under uncertainty has wide legal implications. We have surveyed some of these implications: optimal expenditures on the prevention of terrorism, epidemics, and other widely
borne risks; the design of mechanisms that seek to compensate individuals who suffer physical injury or financial loss, or who are put at
risk of such harm, such as unemployment insurance, workers' compensation, or compensated siting; the use of "individual risk" tests in
risk regulation and the distinction between statistical and identified
victims; whether tort victims should recover pain-and-suffering damages; evidentiary and punishment rules in criminal law; policies regarding financial windfalls, such as the taxation of capital gains and
the use of state lotteries; and the role of ex ante Pareto superiority as a
tax policy norm.
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MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX

This Appendix supplements the text with formal definitions of key
concepts and formal proofs of key results. Unless otherwise stated,
the results herein are, to the best of the authors' knowledge, original.
A policy is a finite set of utility vectors (u',...,u;) E R', one for each
and a probability distribution over states
state s = l,...,S,
Given a policy, write
0 and Zps = 1.'
....
'p )E 1Rs, with all P
(
u s =(us,...,u;) for the utility vector in states and ui =(uI,...,u s ) for individual i's utility profile across states. A social welfare function w maps
utility vectors (u, ..., ui) E R' onto the real numbers. The utility vector
us E R' generated by any policy may be regarded as a random vector,
and the social welfare value of that vector, w(us), a random variable.
The expected values of these random entities are, respectively,
E us]=Zpsusc=IR' and E[w(u1)]=Zpsw(us) lR. Given social
welfare function w, the ex ante social welfare of a given policy is
w( E~u ]),while ex post social welfare is E[w(uT)].
,

A. Utilitarianismand the Equivalence ofEx Ante
and Ex Post Social Welfare Calculations
In this Section, we prove that the only social welfare functions for
which ex ante welfare equals ex post are affine functions of individual
utilities. That is, social welfare functions that are a weighted sum of
individual utilities plus a constant. As remarked in the Article's text,
this result plus symmetry, and the irrelevance of the constant for social
choice, take us to utilitarianism. 39
As discussed in note 58, supra, the following result is often ascribed to Harsanyi, but it is actually more elementary than what Harsanyi proved. It is a generalization to multidimensional domains of
the well-known fact that risk-neutral utility functions are affine.
A function fis linearif f(ax) = af(x) and f(x + y)= f(x)+ f~ ).
as
be
expressed
may
function
a
linear
Equivalently,
,
set
Just
ai ,
i=1.I.
some
for
f(x) = al x,+.*- +ax,,
ai =f(0(,...,.O)). A function f is affine if it may be expressed as
f W)= aix ... + a1x +k for some a,, i = 1..... and k. In this case

138

Equivalently, we could define a policy as a probability measure on the set of all

utility vectors. Notice, however, that we are restricting attention to the subclass of
probability measures with finite support.
139 See supra Part I.C.
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f(0)= k and the function j (x) = f(x)-f(0) is linear. Conversely, if
1(x) is linear, then f (x) = j (x) + k is affine for any k.
PROPOSITION 1: Consider w :
- R. Iffor all policies,
EHUI)]

=

w(E[u)

(3)

then w is affine.
Proof. First, suppose that w(O)= 0. We will show that w must be
linear. First, we show that for all x e R' and all a c R,
w(ax) = aw(x).

(4)

Take any x e R' and any a e R. If a E [0,1], then ax is a convex combination of x and 0. Thus, (4) is immediate from (3) and the assumption that w(0) = 0. If a > 1, then x itself is a convex combination of ax
and 0:
-(ax) + (1-1)0 = x.
Therefore, by (3)
w(x)=-±w(ax)+(1-)w(0)

='

aw(x)=w(ax).

(5)

And if a < 0, then 0 is a convex combination of ax and -ax:
-ax+j(-ax)=0,
so that by (3) and the results above for positive a,
w(0) = 1-w(ax) + w(-ax) = w(ax) = -w(-ax) = -- aw(x) = aw(x).
Next, we will show that for all x,yeIR', w(x +.Y)=w(x)+ w(y).
Thus, consider any x, y eIR,. We have x+y=2(-x+2
2Y) and so by
(4) and (3),
w(x+y)= 2w(lx +1y)= 2- w(x) + 21w(y)= w(x)+ w(y).

We have thus shown that w is linear if w(O) = 0. If w(O) # 0, then
consider 2(x)=w(x)-w(0).
Equation (3) holds also for 1(x).
Thus, i,(x) is linear, implying that w(x) is affine. Q.E.D.
B. Equity Regard
We say that utility vector (u, ..... u;) may be derived from utility vector (u1 ,

.... ,u)

by means of a (pairwise) mean-preserving (stricdy) equaliz-

ing transfer, if and only if for some pair of individuals i, j with i # j
and some transfer ti,t 1 # 0 with t. = -tj,
(u'....,u" ) = (u,,...,ui +ti,...,u +t 1 ,...,u,) and
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iu, +t, -(uj +tj)l < u,-uUj I.

(6)

A social welfare function w is equity regarding (i.e., satisfies the
Pigou-Dalton principle) if and only if, whenever (u, ... u') may be derived from (u1,..., u) by a mean-preserving equalizing transfer, w assigns a strictly higher value to (uu').
A technically weaker restriction found in the literature, and also
referred to as the "Pigou-Dalton principle," requires only that the social welfare function increase in the special case that the equalizing
transfer does not alter the utility rank of the two individuals i and j. In
essence, this weaker definition adds the condition ]tI = tjt 1 Lui -Uj
to the definition of "mean-preserving equalizing transfer." However,
given anonymity/symmetry, this alternative definition is equivalent to
the one we provide here. As is evident from Figure 2, an equalizing
transfer that reverses rank is equivalent to an equalizing transfer that
does not reverse rank plus an exchange of utilities between the two
individuals. The non-rank-reversing transfer must increase welfare
under the weaker Pigou-Dalton condition, and the exchange of utilities cannot change welfare given the anonymity/symmetry assumption.
,

Figure 2

Iu

UI

Alternatively, one can ostensibly strengthen the Pigou-Dalton
principle by specifying that the social welfare function must increase if
the second utility vector can be obtained from the first via any sequence
of mean-preserving equalizing transfers. Extending the principle to
sequences has no effect, however, given the assumed transitivity of the
social welfare ordering (which is reflected in the fact that the ordering can be represented by a social welfare function).
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C. Rank-Weighted Social Welfare and the Gini Coefficient
This Section supplements the discussion in Part I.B, above, regarding the interpretation of the Gini coefficient and its relationship
to rank-weighted social welfare functions. The results in this Section
are not original. As discussed in note 45, supra, the Gini coefficient is
typically written as
-2 ,u 2 Z _j~ Z

j=II~

1

where ui = 7U - -u is mean utility. In what follows it is more convenient to work with an equivalent definition, in which each pairwise
difference is added only once:
1U 12z=

Consider

1

the

j= i

-U

double

sum

in this equivalent statement:
u-u:.The number of times a given u. is added or sub,=1
z-1=i-tracted in this double sum depends on how often it is the larger utility
in a pair. Each time it is the larger utility, it is added. Each time it is
the smaller, it is subtracted. Specifically, the i h smallest utility is
added i times and subtracted I-(i-1) times (including in both cases
the pair (i,i) where it is repeated). Therefore, the double sum is, in
essence, a rank-weighted sum with higher weights for more highly
ranked utilities. Specifically, if we rearrange the utility vector so that
U1 u2 < ...
< u1 ,then

GI'
=E=,zi, uU,I= Ei~l~

(_tl)U

= Z I=,(2i -(I + 1)) u,.
From this fact follows the close relationship between rankweighted social welfare and the Gini coefficient. Thus, take any rankweighted social welfare function where the ranking increment is constant. Such a welfare function may always be written as
w = ZI=l ((k + aI) -ai)

ui ,

where the utility vector is arranged so that u1 < u2 <...<u i ...uI , where
k > 0 summed with aI is a ranking constant, and where a is the constant ranking increment. Then,
=

-'
((k+ al - ai) + -(2i - (I + 1))--(2i -(I + l)))u
=[

((k + aI- /i )+

(-a

(I + 1)))u,- T

=(k +aI - -E(I+ 1)) U- -EUIG
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For every I, this welfare function w ranks utility vectors the same as
In the limit as I---co, - goes to (-U- fUG).
The case discussed
40

= 0.1
in the text is that in which a=l and k

D. Transfers That Are DisequalizingExPost and Equalizing Ex Ante
This Section proves the result discussed in Part II.A. (The proposition is stated without symbolic notation, but its symbolic formulation
is clear from the proof to follow. A similar statement applies to several
of the propositions to follow.)
PROPOSITION 2: If the status quo is uncertain, and there is some inequality in some state, then we can always find a mean-preserving transfer in some
state that is disequalizing with respect to the utility vector in that state, yet
equalizing with respect to the vector of expected utilities.
Proof. The text essentially proves the result in the case that there
is at least one rank-contrary state (as there defined).
Suppose, then, that there is no rank-contrary state and suppose
that individual j's utility is at least as great as individual i's in all states.
By definition of the expected value operation, 3s such that p' > 0
and u s -u'
E-Fu
Us
The interval
Define t= uj -u' +c, for any
from which e is drawn is nonempty: rank conformity plus inequality
in some state implies E[uS -uS] > 0, and uncertainty in the status quo
implies 1 -pS >0. Because t>u, -u i , transferring t from j to i is
strictly disequalizing in state s. The transfer, though initially in an
equalizing direction, "overshoots." On the other hand, using the fact
that <
E
- u ]
the transfer of expected utility is

(7)

p

Further, by choice of s, p' > 0, and so pSt > 0. Combined with (7),
this means that the transfer of t from j to i in state s positively equalizes
ex ante. Q.E.D.
E. Strict Concavity
This Section proves the result discussed in Part II.C above. A realvalued function f : R' -> IR is strictly concave if and only if for all x, y E IR'
with x # y, and all t E (0,1), f(tx +(l-t)y)> tf(x)+(1-t)f(y).

See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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The reasoning behind the following proposition is familiar from
the analysis of concave functions. The proof, which is not original, is
recited here for the convenience of the reader.
PROPOSITION 3: A social welfare function is strictly concave ifand only
iffor all policies ex ante social welfare strictly exceeds ex post.
Proof. Suppose, first, that the social welfare function is strictly concave. Take any policy. The proof that ex ante social welfare is strictly
greater than ex post is by induction. If S = 2, then
w(E[ul) = w(p'u' +(I_ pl)u2)
> p'w(u')+(1-pl)w(u2)=E[w(u)].

Now suppose that the same holds for policies with S -1 states and
with
S states. Consider the probability measure
consider
211 sji a policy
p2
pS
p ,...,p -",.,--on states 2,...,S. Then,

w(

[ ])

w(pu 1 + (1- p'

)EP, [u'])

> p w(u')+(1- p')w(E 1 [u'])

> p w(ul)+(1-pl)E, 1w(u)]

Conversely, suppose the function is not strictly concave. Then, by
the negation of the definition of strict concavity, we can find some
policy (with two outcomes) for which ex ante social welfare is not
strictly greater than ex post. Q.E.D.
F. PermutingPolicies
This Section proves the result discussed in Part JI.D above: every
uncertain permuting policy (as there defined) has a greater valuation
ex ante than ex post, independent of the choice of equity-regarding
social welfare function. A bistochasticmatrix is a square matrix of nonnegative elements, each of whose rows and columns add to one. A
permutation matrix is a bistochastic matrix all of whose elements are either 1 or 0.
The definition of equity regard provided above in Appendix Section B tests whether the social welfare function increases under every
mean-preserving transfer between any two individuals that equalizes
their utilities. The literature provides an equivalent definition of equity regard in terms of linear transformations of utility vectors via
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premultiplication by bistochastic matrices. 4 ' In essence, transforming
a utility vector by a bistochastic matrix replaces each individual's utility with a weighted average of all individuals' utilities. The weighting
may be different across individuals, but the sum (and so the mean) of
all individuals' utilities must remain the same. This averaging process
is equivalent to a series of mean-preserving equalizing (pairwise)
transfers. From this follows the equivalence of the two definitions of
equity regard.
The portion of this equivalence that is important for our purposes
is as follows. We use bold capital letters to represent matrices and
bold lowercase letters to represent column vectors.
LEMMA: If Q is a bistochastic matrix and u a utility vector, then an equity-regardingsocial welfare function assigns no lower value to Qu than to u.
If Q contains at least one element that is neither zero nor one, then the social
welfare of Qu will be strictly greater than u.
The following Lemma links the foregoing feature of equity regard
to permutation matrices, and so to permuting policies.
LEMMA: The weighted average of permutation matrices is a bistochastic
matrix.
Proof. It is clear that each element of the weighted average of
permutation matrices is nonnegative. Consider row 1 of the weighted
average matrix. This is the weighted average of first rows of the permutation matrices. The weighted contribution of the first permutation matrix is a row with all zeros except for one entry, which is p, . A
similar statement holds for each of the other permutation matrices.
Therefore, the sum of the elements of the first row of the weighted
average matrix must be 1. Similar reasoning applies to every other
row and column. Q.E.D.
PROPOSITION 4: Suppose each outcome of some policy is the permutation
of a given vector of utilities. Suppose also that the social welfare function is
equity regarding. Then, whatever the probability of each state, ex ante social
welfare is no less than ex post. Moreover, ex ante welfare is strictly greater than
ex post if the probabilitiesdo not put all weight on one state.
Proof. By hypothesis, there exists u,. 1 =(u,...,u)', such that for all
s, ux= P1 × u1 , where each P 5, is a permutation matrix. For all
probability distributions ps,, over states, the vector of expected utlilities may be written

See, e.g., Partha Dasgupta et al., Notes on the Measurement of Inequality, 6J. ECON.
THEORY 180, 182-83 (1973).
141
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s
+ ... +

PS

Pgtp, +... + pISis]Uixl

Therefore, by the immediately preceding Lemma, expected utility is a
bistochastic transformation of the permuted utility vector. And, by
the first Lemma in this Section, the expected utility vector attains at
least as high or strictly higher social welfare (depending on the condition in the last sentence of the Proposition), assuming regard for equity. Q.E.D.
G. Separable Social Welfare
This Section proves the result discussed in Part II.E: a continuous,
symmetric, separable social welfare function is equity regarding if and
only if it is strictly concave. The results are most likely not original. A
symmetric social welfare function is (individual) separableif and only if
it may be written as w(U 1,...,U,)=(u1 )+...+59(u,) for some uniform
transformationfunction V: R -> R. We will need the following equivalent definition of strict concavity for continuous functions:
LEMMA: A continuousfunction f is strictly concave if and only if for all
x,y, f(2x2y)>2f(x)+lf(y).
142
Proof Well known.
LEMMA: A continuous, symmetric, and separable social welfare function
w is equity regardingif and only if its transformationfunction P is strictly concave.
Proof For the "if' implication: if the transformation function is
strictly concave, then so is the social welfare function as a whole, implying that the social welfare function is equity regarding.
For the "only if" implication: if the social welfare function is separable, symmetric, and continuous, then it is the sum of uniformly
transformed utilities, and the uniform transformation function must
be continuous. If the transformation function is not, in addition,
strictly concave, then by the equivalent definition of concavity for continuous functions, as stated in the immediately preceding Lemma,
there exists u,u', with u>u', s.t. 0(u+±u')<- (u)+{qO(u'), or
equivalently 20(lu +lu')<q5(u)+b(u'). This implies that transferring
(u- u') from an individual with u to an individual with u' < u does

142 See,

e.g.,

PlanetMath,

Convex

Function,

http://planetmath.org/

convexfunction.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2006).
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not strictly increase social welfare. Therefore, the social welfare function is not equity regarding. Q.E.D.
PROPOSITION 5: A continuous, symmetric, and separable social welfare
function w is equity regardingifand only ifit is strictly concave.
Proof. The transformation Vo is strictly concave if and only if
Eqp(ui) is strictly concave. Given this, apply the immediately preceding Lemma. QE.D.
H. Compensation
This Section proves the result regarding "double free transferability," discussed in Part III.A.3 above.
PROPOSITION 6: [ordinal degeneration to utilitarianism with freely
transferable utility across individuals and states]: Suppose that the social
welfare function w is continuous and Paretian. Consider any two utility map,ri'<-0 and u'+r->0,
trices u 1 ,u 2'EIR' s . Then Vr' (IR l s with
R" s with L, Pr <0 and u 2 +r 2 >0 s.t.
3r2 El

Z".

,p w(u, +

) (>)

pw + +

(8)

ifand only if
Eps

,u2 =ZiZpSu2 >(>)EZiEpSul =ZPSXYiu.

(9)

REMARK: The Lemma should be read either with weak inequality
in both (8) and (9) or with strict inequality in both (8) and (9).
REMARK: The proposition implies that double free transferability
"equates" utilitarianism (which itself is the same ex ante and ex post)
with both ex post and ex ante application of any continuous Paretian
social welfare function w. Ex post application of w is "equated" with
ex post utilitarianism in the sense that utility matrix u2 is preferred, as
a startingpointfor transfers, to utility matrix u' (as per (8)) if and only
if u 2 's expected utility sum over individuals is higher (as per (9)). Ex
ante application is similarly equated with ex ante utilitarianism a fortiori, since the proposition holds when S =1, wherein u2 and u' are
single column matrices whose entries can be interpreted as expected
utilities.143 Therefore, because there is no divergence between ex ante

143

Note that there is no advantage to differentiating transfers by state when the

welfare function is applied ex ante; all that matters is the effective transfer of expected
utility.
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and ex post utilitarianism, there is no divergence between ex ante and
ex post application of w (ignoring the potentially differing transfer
schemes that each approach would institute). In other words, if policy
A is preferred to policy B (anticipating adjustment with free transferability across individuals and states) under w applied ex ante, A is also
preferred to B under w applied ex post (anticipating a potentially different adjustment with free transferability across individuals and
states).
Free transferability of utility across individuals is inherent in the
effect of transfers on individual utilities in (8) and in the fact that the
constraint that transfers be nonpositive sum in expected value, the
"budget balance constraint," applied to the constructed transfer r 2 ,
allows for transfer schemes that are precisely zero sum (in expectation). This is easiest to see in the simple case of within-state transfers.
The budget balance constraint allows us to increase individual l's utility in state 1 by one unit in return for decreasing individual 2's utility
in state 1 by one unit.
Free transferability of utility across states is inherent in the fact that
the budget balance constraint requires that the constructed transfer
T2 be zero sum only in expectation across states. (That it may be negative sum is superfluous.) Free transferability across states would not
hold were the constructed transfer required to be zero sum within each
state.
Proof Suppose Js Ps > ( )Z Ps
Take any transfer matrix
r I EI Xs s.t.
psris <_0
< and u'+ r' >0. Define the transfer matrix
2
2
T"
=U1 + T -U
(+l),
where e>0 and 1 is an IxS-matrix all of whose elements are 1. (Note: as indicated by parentheses, c1 is added only in the strict
inequality case.)
Notice that
=
i, psu iZi
+
, pr
- Ziu
< (<)0 (if e> 0
is small enough). Further, u 2 +r 2 =(>)u' +T > 0, from which we may
conclude not only that u 2 + 2 > 0, but also that, for every s,
w(u2 + r2) _ (>)w(u + ri), given that w is Paretian.
A fortiori,

Z.

(2+,2

(>)Z PsW(Ul +

Cp
suppose
Esonversely,

i,u

)._

is

<
2s()Z-spsui's.
<(<

Lt

mxiz

Let P'

maximize

.. pow(USo+r1) subject to .,,-r,rs <0 and u1 +r' >0 . (This maximum exists because w is continuous, and the constraint set is compact.)
The claim is that there is no r' with Z s
<0 and
+2
0 S.t.
sPs(
s)-pw(u
+ z).
If there were, we
could
set
r =u 2 + r 2 U +6l
with
e > (>)0
and
have
a)
e
>(z)O;
enough
small
for
0
rs
'psu, is) Zp
p- Zp r (

<(!
)o
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b) u' + r' >-u
+ r 2 >_0; and c) given that w is Paretian, for all s,
w(u' + ) (_)w(u s + r,),implyingj, pw(u, + rs)> (>)
p, w(us +rT).
Given the supposition
pw(u + ^1)
2+),
+
this conl
tradicts, by transitivity, the definition of z~
. Q.E.D.

Z

I. Nonfreely Transferable Utility
This Section formalizes results discussed in Part III.A.3 above.
LEMMA: [ex ante decomposition of transfers]: Let r c= IR denote the
transfer of utility to individual i in state j. Let W denote the subset of ex ante
winners under the transfer, that is, individualsfor whom: E
0. Let L
denote the subset of ex ante losers, namely, individualsfor whom E [r i ] < O.
Then,

+

cost of wansfer

Proof Immediate.
REMARK: This Lemma says that the aggregate transfer to the losers
(negative) is the additive inverse of the aggregate transfer to the winners (positive or zero) less the expected cost of the transfers,
F[,,
/- Notice that the expected cost of the transfers combines
the loss, if any, within each state with the loss, if any, across states.
PROPOSITION 7: Suppose that expected utilities are equal across individuals in utility matrix u E_ "s'. Then every transferscheme { r/} with posi1 r I<0 ) is ex ante welfare reducing (given Paretitive expected costs (Ej
anism and equity regard).
Proof Refer to the decomposition in the above Lemma and imagine that the transfer is accomplished in two steps. First, the cost of the
transfer is taken from some losers with no compensating increase in
the utility of any winner. Second, the remainder of the transfer is
taken from losers and given to winners. The first portion of this decomposition, which adds E[Z' r/I <0 to the aggregate expected
utility for the losers, is a Pareto infirior move from an ex ante perspective and so reduces ex ante social welfare. Note that, given initial
equality, every loser has no greater expected utility than every winner
after this change. The second portion of the decomposition, the
transfer from losers to winners of 1X E[ij/]> 0, is then (given the
initial portion of the decomposition) disequalizing. Specifically, one
can represent it as the composition of a series of pairwise disequalizing transfers. Q.E.D.
REMARK: This result speaks to the persistence of ex ante/ex post
disagreement when transfers are possible, but costly. It says that any

[Z
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equity-regarding Paretian ex ante planner disprefers any costly transfer from a position of equal expected utilities. Examples of utility matrices are easy to find wherein expected utilities are equal ex ante, but
not ex post. Indeed, many of the examples in the text conform to this
pattern. In this case, assuming continuous welfare, whatever the ex
post planner's degree of equity regard, we can always find a transfer
cost small enough such that she prefers to make the transfer, contrary
to the preferences of her ex ante counterpart. Conversely, whatever
the cost of transferring, we can always find an ex post planner with
sufficient equity regard to prefer the transfer. Neither of these two
dimensions of variation-degrees of positive equity regard or degrees
of positive transfer cost-will affect the fact that the ex ante planner
will oppose the transfer.
REMARK: As noted by numerical example in the text, the general
point-that ex post and ex ante planners may disagree over costly
compensation schemes that mitigate ex post inequality-is not dependent on perfect ex ante inequality.
J. Time Inconsistency of the Ex Ante Approach
This Section discusses in more detail the coin flipping example in
Part V.B.3. Recall that the planner, whose welfare function equals the
sum of utilities less half their difference, is deciding which of two individuals should receive 100 utils. The planner cannot split that total
between them. In each period she may choose to flip a fair coin, but
each coin toss reduces the amount to be allocated by 1 util. Suppose
that x, utils are left to be allocated after the th toss, where t = 0,1, 2,....
Will the ex ante planner want to toss the coin again? If she chooses
not to toss again, social welfare is x, +0-02-0
=2 x,. If she chooses
to toss, social welfare is 2(x, -1)+(x,-1)+
(x,-1)-(x,-1) = x, -1.
Thus, the planner chooses to toss the coin so long as
x, -1 >-xt
> 2. Therefore, the ex ante planner spends 98 utils
deciding how to allocate the 100, finally giving the remaining 2 utils
to the individual who wins the ninety-eighth toss.
K. Application: Spending on Prevention
This Section formalizes the discussion surrounding note 116, supra. Suppose that (a) there are two individuals, each starting with 100
utils; (b) no more than one individual will be attacked; (c) each individual is equally likely to be attacked; (d) the probability of an attack is
p(s), where s, the policy variable, is the (equal) cost imposed on each
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individual for security spending stated in terms of utils, and p' < 0,
p" > 0, p'(O) = -o; (e) an attack causes the harmed individual to lose
all 100 utils; and (f) the individual and time-separable equityregarding social welfare function is the sum of utilities less half their
absolute difference: u, +u 2 -- jlu,-u 2
Then, each individual's expected utility from an attack is
-s + (100) + (1-p(s))(100)

1.

lO0--2p(s)100.
Ex ante social welfare is
2(100-s- -p(s)100)
=-s+

200-2s- p(s)100,
and ex ante social welfare is maximized where the first order condition is fulfilled:
-2- p'100 = 0, or
p'(sA) =-510.
=

Ex post social welfare, however, is
-((p(s))2(lOO-s)+p(s)(lOO-2s-1lO00-

O))

+ ((1 - p (s)) 2(100 -s)+ p (s) (100 - 2s - -L1100 - 01)
=

(I -p(s))(200-2s)+ p(s)(50-2s)

=

-2s + (1- p(s))200+ p(s)50

= 200 - 2s - p (s)150.
The first order condition for ex post welfare is:
-2- p'150 = 0¢,=> p' (SP) = p. 0

)

Therefore, p'(s) > p'(s ). Given p"f> 0, this means that
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SP > SA.
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